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A Journal of Opinion

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Over-Optimism Again

In the dispatches coming from London this week there is a distinct suggestion of what we used to call war-weariness during 1917 and 1918—a British form of war-weariness, expressing itself in somewhat unreasonable irritations and hopes. The salute of the old thundering London Times to the Russian offensive was a rather querulous inquiry as to why it had not been undertaken early enough to prevent von Rundstedt's push in the West; and before the week was out there were cables quoting some of those "informed military sources" in the British capital to the effect that this was the final offensive of the war and Germany was expected to collapse.

One is about as well justified as the other. There is some military ground for complaint about Russian coöperation—the Russians have put a stop to the hopeful and useful shuttle raids and have consistently refused to exchange military information—but this is not it. Everything that has happened so far in the war demonstrates that the Soviets have made their military decisions in this war on military grounds alone, totally uninfluenced by the political considerations which have played so prominent a part in the strategy of the Western Allies and have often taken the leading role in that of the Nazis.

Why the Russians Waited

If the Soviets attacked in Hungary during December and the first half of January, it was because only in this region did the combination of weather and available lines of communication make it possible to conduct a campaign at all; and because they thought that pressure in the direction of Vienna might draw German troops from Poland, where the really big drive was already planned. In the latter expectation, incidentally, they were perfectly justified. Several of the divisions engaged in the abortive attempt to relieve Budapest had been identified on the front above Cracow as late as December, and Marshal Konev made his big break-through in exactly the spot from which they were withdrawn.

Moreover, it is not likely that an earlier Russian attack would have done anything at all to call off von Rundstedt. The fact that the Nazis reinforced Vienna from Cracow shows they were willing to take some chances in the East in order to attempt a break-through in the West; and while the result of that effort is not one upon which we can congratulate ourselves very heartily, it is clearly one on which the Germans have still less cause for pleasure, now that the returns are all in. They may have halted General Hodges' push from Düren toward Cologne and Patton's still more dangerous drive into the Saar, but they paid for it with more casualties than they could afford, made only the barren gain of a delay, and in the propaganda field, completely broke down that over-optimism in Allied countries that had been so carefully built up during the autumn by German exaggeration of our successes and their own fears.

Withdrawal, Not Collapse

In view of this, it is a trifle surprising to see the "informed military circles" taking up where they left off on December 15. The Russian offensive is a massive movement; it could turn into a major invasion of German territory, but it is perhaps worth remembering that after a week of the von Rundstedt attack, the capture of Antwerp and the splitting of the Allied armies seemed not improbable. The Soviet report on the first week of their drive mentions 20,000 prisoners; von Rundstedt bagged about 18,000 in the same space of time. In central Poland beyond Warsaw

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Russian progress has been at the rate of more than 30 miles a day; a modern army marching over hard roads under good conditions makes about this much when there is no opposition, which means that there cannot be very much facing Marshal Zhukov's men.

This is not to play down the Russian achievement or prospects. At least in Konev's area to the south, they have handed the Nazis an extremely nasty surprise by making the weight of the attack so much greater than anticipated. At a single bound and with its offensive power undiminished, this group of armies has reached a line where at last it directly threatens an area of major importance to the whole German war effort. The south Silesian industrial region today probably turns out more war materials than either the Ruhr or the Saar.

Still Trading Space for Time

But it has not been captured or cut off or damaged yet; and when German internal news broadcasts can say that there "has never been anything so horrible" as the Soviet offensive, it is to the obvious interest of the enemy to exaggerate everything the Russians have done or are doing, or likely to do. What has actually happened in a military sense is this: in Poland from Warsaw south to Cracow the Russians have broken through a light screen of rearguards and gone rushing up to the main line of resistance. Konev, toward the Silesian frontier, has come stronger, gone faster and farther than the Germans expected, and there is undoubtedly an emergency call for reserves there. As to what the position in East Prussia is, how much space the Nazis expected to trade for time there, it is impossible to say as yet. But nowhere has the main battle been engaged; everywhere the game is still in the stage where one party advances a pawn and the other retreats a knight, and to talk of the Germans being crushed now is to recover those roseate hours of last fall when preparations for V (E) day were being made in an atmosphere of complete unreality.

Fourth Term

The President's fourth term begins with something of a renewal of a honeymoon atmosphere, and his inaugural address, calling in simple, eloquent terms for victory in the war and durable peace, did nothing to

Germany Finally Encircled

The chief importance of the Russian offensive at the end of this week had been to make Germany more than ever vulnerable to the ultimate effects of a blockade by depriving her of agricultural regions, and to create, for the first time in the war, a situation in which all the Nazi armies were fully engaged on every front. If Allied resources in the West were equal to the recapture of the initiative, there was a possibility of achieving something decisive; but the real battle for Germany was only beginning.

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dispel that feeling. As he goes to meet with Stalin and Churchill, the degree of support for his foreign policy in Congress and throughout the country is at its highest point. The war is progressing as well as we have any right to expect. Even our differences of opinion on the home front seem momentarily less important, though a storm seems to be brewing in Congress over the proposed substitution of Henry Wallace for Jesse Jones. Probably it was inevitable that this Era of Good Feeling should vanish soon, and especially when we realize that decisions will be made in the next months and years that are likely to fix the pattern of life in this country for generations to come.

Wallace for Commerce

We do not propose to throw our hat in the air because the President has selected Henry Wallace for Secretary of Commerce. Mr. Wallace is such a useful public citizen, and the President's obligation to him is so overwhelming, that Mr. Roosevelt could hardly have done less, and might easily have done more. At the same time, we recognize that the President may pay a high price for the discharge of his obligation. Mr. Jones is the darling of the Unholy Alliance of conservatives of both parties in Congress, and inasmuch as he has obviously decided to fight the nomination, Mr. Wallace may have a tough battle. Mr. Jones's attitude confirms the impression that he is only halfheartedly loyal to the President. It fits in with his steady sniping at the New Deal ever since he has been in Washington, and with the fact that persons close to him in Texas were major figures in the effort to turn that state over to the Republicans.

If Mr. Wallace is confirmed, as we assume he will be, we shall have the novel experience of a Department of Commerce run in the interest of the American people, and not in that of a small circle of the wealthy. He can do much to open the doors now held closed by monopoly and special interests. As his article in this issue of The New Republic demonstrates, he is thoroughly well aware of the dangers in the present situation and of ways out.

Mr. Churchill's Apologia

It is very doubtful that Mr. Churchill, in his report on British policy in southern Europe before the House of Commons, succeeded in taking the wind out of the sails of his critics. On the contrary, the total impression remains that Mr. Churchill, in spite of his protesting good will toward the Italians and Greeks and citing an avalanche of "facts," is blind to the disastrous effects of his high-handed interventionist policy on the future of friendly relations between Britain and Italy and Greece. His references to the revolutionary leaders of the North Italian partisans as "violent and vehement politicians," to the Greek ELAS as a "mob" and to the Greek Communists as "Trotskyites" are false, unjust and unwise. His apparently subtle insinuations that Britain does not need Italy as a partner and that the existing government in Athens, "so largely dependent upon our armed forces," will not work with the Communists, only tend to reaffirm the opinion that he is determined to dominate Italy and Greece with an iron hand by supporting the reactionary and conservative elements in these countries.

The Court Turns the Clock Back

One of the great problems confronting this country is the control of international cartels and domestic monopolies. The Supreme Court has made this work enormously more difficult by its recent action in the glass-company case. The Federal District Court of Northern Ohio had ruled that the Hartford-Empire Company and six others were engaged in monopolistic practices in restraint of trade. That court found that invention of glass-making machinery has been discouraged, that competition in the manufacture and sale or licensing of such machinery has been suppressed, that artificial prices were maintained and that competition from outsiders was throttled. In spite of this, the Supreme Court, though nominally upholding the lower court, in fact gave the glass companies practically everything they wanted. The lower court ordered patents made available to anybody who would pay a reasonable fee; this order is revoked. The lower court made the Hartford-Empire Company sell its glass-making machinery; the Supreme Court permits it to go on with its leasing practices, which give it great power over the whole industry. The monopoly will continue to receive "reasonable royalties" on its enormous pool of patents. Mr. Justice Roberts wrote the decision; Justices Black and Rutledge dissented "partially"; Justices Douglas, Murphy and Jackson did not sit. The decision, if the Court sticks to its guns, would seem to make a mockery of the Sherman Act and of all our efforts to get back to genuinely free enterprise.

That Dog

We are extremely sorry that three soldiers were removed from an army transport plane to give the space to a big dog belonging to Colonel Elliott Roosevelt. It was the result of a wretched piece of bureaucratic officiousness. Having expressed our proper indignation, however, we would rise to remark: 1. The plane was not supposed to carry passengers, and the soldiers were just hitch-hiking. 2. The man who gave the dog a high priority couldn't possibly have known that it would cause soldiers to be put off. 3. The man who put the soldiers off was acting under rules which he was not entitled to waive. 4. Colonel Roosevelt didn't know the soldiers would be put off and didn't want this done. 5. Neither did his wife. 6. Neither did the President's wife. 7. Neither did the President. We are aware, however, that none of these explanations will

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do any good with the newspaper editors of the hate-Roosevelt school, who have done their best to create an impression that the President sat up nights plotting to put the soldiers off the plane and rubbed his hands in glee when the foul deed was done.

"Strengthening Congress"

The serious attention which has been paid the National Planning Association's latest report on "Strengthening Congress" is a good sign that congressional reform is on the way. The NPA report is the best summary yet made of the improvements which are necessary if Congress is to function effectively. The fact that the NPA report was prepared by Robert Heller, a well known industrial engineer, gives it prestige in the eyes of many practical congressmen.

The Heller report emphasizes the need for simplifying the committee structure and general procedure, urges increased staff assistance both for standing committees and for individual members of Congress, attacks the seniority system for selecting committee chairmen, and recommends that members of Congress should be paid $25,000 per year instead of the $10,000 they now receive, plus service-retirement pay after 55. The Joint Congressional Committee now authorized to study the reorganization question should find the report a help, although on many points, such as provision for greater party responsibility and a substitute for the seniority rule, the reorganization committee will need to go farther than the NPA has gone.

The Ruthenian Question

Whatever the genuineness of the demand of the sub-Carpathian Ruthenians for incorporation into the Soviet Union rather than into a reconstituted Czecho-Slovakia, the encouragement of this irredentist demand by the Soviet government suggests that Stalin is prepared to deal harshly even with his friends, of whom the Czech President, Mr. Benes, is one of the stoutest. While it may be the delay of the Czecho-Slovakian government in recognizing the Moscow-sponsored Provisional Government of Poland which annoyed Mr. Stalin, it is quite possible that the Kremlin is testing Mr. Benes' friendship by making territorial claims on Czecho-Slovakia. Reports from London indicate that the Czecho-Slovakian government, always following a realistic line, will not raise serious objections. But, as a matter of principle, what justification is there for pushing irredentist claims if the neighboring country intends to respect the rights of the minority, and is under the political thumb of the Big Russian Bear anyway?

The Pope's Christmas Message

The Catholic weekly, The Commonweal, is edited as a rule with good sense and discrimination. We were startled, therefore, to find in its issue of January 12 more than a column of bitter attack upon The New Republic because of a seven-line item which appeared in our Bandwagon department in the issue of January 1. This item quoted from the Christmas message of Pope Pius the following words:

> It is a pleasure for us to express equal praise and gratitude for the generosity of the head of the state, the government and people of Spain, and the governments of Ireland, Argentina . . . who have vied with one another in noble rivalry of brotherly love and charity, of which the echo will not resound in vain to the world.

The Commonweal objects to this item for the following reasons: 1. We omitted the names of thirteen other nations, indicated by the dots in the sentence. 2. We asked the reader "to sneer at the Pope" and to think that "the Pope is quaint." 3. This was one of only three items in the Bandwagon that week. 4. The Pope was talking about serious suffering and "it is improper to use this suffering for a joke, for a political joke."

Certainly, we regret having offended the editors of The Commonweal, and anyone else who may have felt himself offended. We are glad to supply the names of the missing countries which were stricken out of our comment: Australia, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Italy, Lithuania, Peru, Poland, Rumania, Slovakia, Hungary and Uruguay. Far from sneering at the Pope, or inviting our readers to consider him quaint, or making a joke about suffering, we did not add one solitary word of comment to what the Pope said (and there were six items in our Bandwagon department, not three). It seems to us that the passage is precisely as significant and interesting, whether or not the other thirteen countries are included.

People in the Limelight: V

Charles I. Stanton, deputy administrator of civil aeronautics, is a man little known in this country, but very well known abroad. It is significant that nearly all the foreign technicians who came to the United States for the International Civil Aviation Conference at Chicago asked to meet him. In the course of his years of service with the Post Office Department Airmail Service and later with the Civil Aeronautics Administration and its predecessor agencies, Stanton has probably done more than any other one man to build up the United States's 35,000-mile network of air routes, equipped with radio-direction signals, communications and weather-reporting facilities, air-traffic control, radio and light beacons, intermediate landing fields and other aids to flying by day or night, in good weather or bad. Without the plans which he put through, we could not have seen the 2,202 million passenger-miles flown by civilian airlines during 1944 and the undisclosed but far greater amount of military traffic. Stanton was responsible for the Civil Aeronautics Administration

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during the time when it established air routes across African jungles, Pacific atolls and other odd corners of the world. Both military and civilian aeronautics owe him, as the leaders in both fields are quick to admit, a heavy debt of gratitude.

Manpower

THE PROBLEM of what to do about manpower is one of the most difficult that this country has ever faced. The army, the navy and the President declare that there is a shortage so severe it can only be met by universal compulsory national service. They want the power to take anybody who is not in uniform, no matter who he is or what he is doing, and put him to work where he can best serve the war effort, regardless of any other consideration. This is an appeal of the greatest seriousness. Within reason, the President and the armed forces should be given everything they want, without question or hesitation. The fact that momentarily the war seems to be going well on all fronts, just as a few weeks ago it was going badly on most of them, should not be an important element in the decision. It would be a fearful responsibility to deny the army and the navy the legislation they request if this meant responsibility for possibly losing the war. They should not be refused if there is even a faint chance that they may be right.

At the same time, there are a few facts which need to be brought into the picture before a final decision is made. One of them is that the armed services stand alone, in any real sense, in making this demand. The President, it seems clear, was persuaded against his better judgment. The civilian manpower organizations and the individual experts of the government opposed the scheme until they were pressured into lukewarm support. The armed services have done an extremely bad expository job in describing the present and impending situation. Various spokesmen do not agree with one another as to the facts, and all sorts of contradictory sets of figures are employed. In insisting on a single panacea, the armed services ignore many other factors: hoarding of labor by employers, discrimination against Negroes and others, reluctance to pay overtime, waste of labor in nonessential luxury trades, low wages and bad conditions which account for a large part of the turnover in many plants.

Even the size of the problem is open to dispute. Everyone knows by now that such shortages as have occurred on any fighting front have been the result of transportation bottlenecks. These have been partly due to the Germans' still holding some French ports, partly to the mistaken assumption that Germany would fold up some months ago, which caused the war in the Pacific to be speeded up unwisely. Now the military authorities who have, quite sensibly, turned pessimistic again, are talking about shortages, not as of this moment, but at varying future times up to six months or more from now.

J. A. Krug, chairman of the WPB, ought to know more than anybody else about the causes of shortages in war materials. He says that 40 percent of the total problem is the result of revised estimates, which were first cut down recklessly and then increased. Twenty-five percent is due to changes in design through battle experience. Ten percent is an actual shortage of factory facilities in the light of such changes. Twenty-five percent is a shortage of labor, but of this, one-half is the shortage of workers to produce cotton duck. This is a special problem which has existed for more than a year and would not be solved by national legislation. The other 12.5 percent is labor shortage of the kind the army and the navy are talking about.

But even here, the facts seem to be in dispute. New Jersey is considered one of the most critical labor-shortage areas in the country. An investigation among war plants in New Jersey showed that two-thirds of them closed down for New Year's Day. Only one-quarter of them work as long as fifty-six hours a week. Only one-quarter work three shifts, and 42 percent work only one shift. In one case, believed to be typical, an employer who was loudly demanding several hundred more workers for a war plant was at the same time employing several hundred workers of the same type on luxury goods for civilians in another factory near by. In this area, many thousands of workers are making nonessential civilian goods, using materials for which the plants are given priorities in Washington. In spite of having war contracts, many employers refuse to work overtime because their profits might be reduced thereby.

Philip Murray of the CIO points out that the armed services are asking immediately a transfer of 141,000 men out of a labor force of 53 million, or three in one thousand. He points out that even this degree of need is problematical. Some plants listed by the armed services as having acute shortages, in fact now have all the workers they need, and are even laying off men. This is true, Mr. Murray says, of 25 percent of all war plants and of 75 percent of the steel mills. Employment in war plants has gone down 1,100,000 recently, either because men and women have been laid off or because of remediable conditions such as low wages, bad housing and transportation, and tyrannical management. It is well known that some employers on cost-plus are hoarding workers far beyond their actual requirements and letting the government foot the bill. There are many plants which, though they say they have a shortage, still refuse to employ women or Negroes or Mexicans. Negroes, in particular, are subject to gross discrimination in spite of the Fair Employment Practice Committee.

In general, the problem of organizing and scheduling war production has been pretty badly bungled by

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the United States. While our results have been extraordinarily impressive both in quantity and in quality, this has been because of our overwhelming resources, equipment and skill, and not because of wise use of what we have. Efficiency engineers who have been active both in the last war and in this one say that in many ways we did a better job the first time. The army and the navy, for reasons easy to understand and not discreditable to anyone individually, have never fully understood or mastered the processes of big-scale modern production. They have suffered from three outstanding faults: 1. Failure to get all the necessary facts and to reduce them to a simple over-all picture. 2. A tendency to hoard raw materials of all types in absurdly large quantities, creating great and unnecessary hardships on civilians. 3. A tendency to give the majority of their contracts to a few big firms, without making any real effort to subcontract or to use the medium-sized and small plants which, as experience elsewhere has proved, can be of the utmost value.

Ever since the war began, there has been an incessant and deadly struggle in Washington between the armed services and civilians as to who should have control of the entire national economy. Repeatedly, the army and the navy have sought to extend their authority; they are sincere in believing that such control is necessary and that they can do a good job of it. While their point of view has certain advantages over that of the business community, it also has certain defects. The army and the navy are insensitive to public opinion even when it happens to be right, and even on subjects as to which it ought to be consulted. They are inclined to give peremptory orders when better results can be obtained by persuasion. On every previous occasion when they have sought to get control, Congress and the country have decided against it.

The present demand for universal national service is, of course, no more and no less than a repetition of this struggle, which has been in process since the beginning of the war. It is disturbing to find among some high-ranking officers and some of their allies in civilian life a desire to "crack down" on the population in general, not for the sake of getting out the goods and winning the war but "to put people in a proper frame of mind." A psychologist might find some connection between this attitude, which is like that of a Cromwell looking at the court of Charles I, and the frustrations which are inherent in holding a desk job far behind the front while your fellow officers are meeting the enemy almost face to face. It should be obvious that the psychological attitude of the American people should be no concern of our admirals and generals except in so far as it affects our ability to fight and to win the war. Thus far, it seems clear that the public psychology has been of little significance as a factor in the war, compared with the mishandling of men and materials described above.

Everyone agrees that there should be better control of production and of manpower. There should be a ceiling on employment, curtailment of luxury production, the removal of labor from nonessential to essential work. The army and the navy should drop many of their unnecessary and hampering requirements, such as the navy's refusal to accept married nurses, and the minute differences in requirements on the same items for one service or the other. Philip Murray has suggested an immediate conference of spokesmen for industry, labor, agriculture and the government to determine where the faults lie and how to remedy them. This should be followed by a series of conferences at a lower level, since shortages of manpower, in so far as they exist, are always local in character and nearly always to be solved by local action. The question is whether these problems can best be solved by use of civilian agencies such as the War Manpower Commission, and by trying many things at once, or by a simple resort to universal conscription to be managed by military men, who, to phrase it conservatively, seem to have little conception of the size or character of the job, or how to handle it successfully. It may be that, for the sake of the morale of the soldiers at the front, we shall find it necessary to adopt some form of national service; but if we do, it would be well to remember that it is done for propaganda purposes purely and that it will, almost beyond a doubt, hinder and not help the production of the tools of victory.

Toward a National Budget

PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S recent budget message to Congress represents a landmark of progress toward a rational fiscal policy. For the first time in history, an attempt has been made to go beyond the federal government's narrow dollars-and-cents bookkeeping to the more fundamental balance account for the whole economy. For the first time the government's budget has been brought into relation with the nation's budget.

The accompanying table, taken from the budget message itself, is especially illuminating because it compares 1944 with 1939. Even amid the crescendo of total war, the federal government absorbed something less than one-half of the $197 billion gross national product; before the war its share was scarcely a tenth of the shrunken $89 billion gross national product.

It is a great advance to include in the budget the financial position of consumers, business, state and local governments—in addition to that of the federal government. But this is not quite enough. A second important step is now in order. To be truly informative and realistic, *the nation's budget must be defined in terms of full-employment income.*

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When first announced in December by the War Contracts (Murray) Subcommittee of the Senate Military Affairs Committee, this proposal seemed novel, even sensational. Actually, the plan is simple and in accord with common sense. The President and the Budget Bureau are charged each year with estimating the number of jobs corresponding to full employment ("about 60 millions" for the early postwar years). From past experience they estimate the attainable full-employment national income (perhaps $180 billion at postwar price levels). The amount of investment and other expenditure necessary to maintain such a level of income is then estimated.

THE GOVERNMENT'S BUDGET AND THE NATION'S BUDGET

Calendar years 1939 and 1944
(Current prices,[1] in billions)

ECONOMIC GROUP	Calendar year 1939			Calendar year 1944		
CONSUMERS	Receipts	Expenditures	Excess (+), deficit (—)	Receipts	Expenditures	Excess (+), deficit (—)
Income after taxes	$67.3			$132.8		
Expenditures		$61.7			$97.0	
Savings (+)			+$5.6			+$35.8
BUSINESS						
Undistributed profits and reserves	$8.3			$12.3		
Gross capital formation		$10.9			$2.6	
Excess of receipts (+) or capital formation (—)			—$2.6			+$9.7
STATE & LOCAL GOVT.						
Receipts from the public, other than borrowing	$8.9			$10.4		
Payments to the public		$9.1			$8.8	
Excess of receipts (+) or payments (—)			—$0.2			+$1.6
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT						
Receipts from the public, other than borrowing	$6.5			$47.9		
Payments to the public		$9.3			$95.0	
Excess of receipts (+) or payments (—)			—$2.8			—$47.1
Less: Adjustments[2]	$2.4	$2.4		$5.9	$5.9	
TOTAL: GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT						
Receipts	$88.6			$197 5		
Expenditures		$88.6			$197.5	
Balance			0			0

Now our goals are defined. Private enterprise is encouraged and aided in reaching these goals. The likely total of investment and other expenditure by consumers, business, the state, the local and the (ordinary) federal government is calculated. If the probable amount is less than the necessary amount, we are faced with a deficit in the "national production and employment budget." Our accounts will thus not balance while giving full employment. To avoid unemployment and wasted production, the President must estimate how much additional federal expenditure is necessary to balance the nation's budget and avoid a deflationary gap. Similarly in a roaring boom when the budget shows a surplus, balance can be restored by the expedient of reducing expenditures and raising taxes.

[1] Prices in 1944 were between 25 and 30 percent above 1939.
[2] Mainly government expenditures for other than goods and services.

If such a rational budget were drawn up for 1939, we should have seen a deficit in the nation's budget —not a mechanical balance as in the accompanying chart. In view of the unemployment, underemployment and unused capacity then prevailing, our attainable full-employment national income should hardly be put at less than $120 billion for 1939. Thus, we had a deficit in the nation's budget of some $30 billion. But to bring the budget into true balance would not require federal expenditure of this much, but only about one-third as much, or less than $10 billion. History shows that each dollar of federal expenditure, by raising national income, activates several consumer and business dollars and thus is "multiplied."

The exact form of federal expenditure is of course a matter for democratic decision and offers no special problems. Even if privately motivated investment outlets should prove to be stagnant in the future, there can be no inadequacy in the collective or private needs of the American people.

Uncle Sam has been a notoriously bad bookkeeper, penny-wise and dollar-foolish. He calculates no price index of the things he buys; his breakdown of expenditure and capital items is more primitive than that of small business; when the federal cash budget really began to show a surplus just prior to the 1937 recession, the complexity of social-security accounting scandalously concealed this dangerous fact. Many technical reforms are in order. No doubt the able and increasingly powerful Bureau of the Budget will gradually see that they are introduced.

Still more important to the public at large and the national welfare would be a shift in point of view—from anatomy to physiology. When will our accounts cease to be a record of past history, and become tools of control? When shall we cease to be satisfied with irrelevant calculations which are precise to six digits, and insist upon having fundamentally important estimates which may be off by five percent but are in the right general direction?

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Jobs for All

FULL EMPLOYMENT in the United States is the first step on the road to permanent worldwide peace. Other nations look at the tremendous economic power of the United States, at the violent fluctuations in the American business cycle, at the previously demonstrated ineptitude of the American government in dealing with the problem—and, after seeing all this and looking toward the future, they shudder and pray. They pray for full employment in the United States, not because they love the United States, but because they know that without full employment here there is worldwide trouble.

Without full employment here we undermine world price levels and world trade, the results of which reach into the economic and political fabric of every other country. Without full employment we cannot have a successful foreign economic policy of reduced trade barriers and a high volume of both exports and imports.

In this session of Congress one of the first bills to be introduced will no doubt be the full-employment bill of 1945, designed to carry out item number one in the Economic Bill of Rights. This bill, or some other bill dealing with full employment, will become even more significant for the future than the agricultural bills which Congress wrestled with in the twenties. "Equality for agriculture" was the farmers' battle cry beginning in 1924.

For worker, business man, farmer, and above all for the statesman interested in preventing the hardships which create revolution in other countries, the concept of jobs for all is even more important than "price equality for agriculture." Farmers are much better off with price equality and full employment than they are with price equality and unemployment. In other words, a medium piece out of a big pie of consumer purchasing power may be a whole lot larger than a large piece out of a small pie. What the economic statesman wants is the biggest possible pie for the whole world in order that all the nations, all the regions and all the groups may have a good slice.

"Jobs for all" should and will be the economic battle cry of all the peoples of the world for the next twenty years. A phrase of this sort is good as a political slogan, but if it is ever really to amount to anything in the life of the nation it must have a statistical formulation of some kind.

Impetus recently was given to the coming battle for full employment by Jim Patton, president of the National Farmers' Union. I didn't learn the story from Jim Patton or from any Farmers' Union member. A government statistician told me how Patton, pondering on the role of investment for a postwar gross national output of $200 billion, was impressed by the Simon Kuznets national-income data. Here he found that over any 10-year period about 20 percent of the total volume of goods and services produced in this country was represented by so-called "capital formation." As I understand it, gross-capital formation, as used by the Department of Commerce and the National Bureau of Economic Research, consists of new construction of all kinds, including buildings, roads and plant and equipment, for both replacement and expansion. In 1929, when there was substantially full employment, these items amounted to around $20 billion and the total national product of goods and services was around $100 billion.

In order to have full employment after the war, Jim Patton reasoned that it would be necessary to have a total product of $200 billion at present prices and wages, and therefore an annual expenditure on capital goods amounting to around $40 billion. He was anxious to stimulate discussion and hoped the $40-billion figure would serve that purpose. Patton was a friend of Senator Murray of Montana, who was also chairman of the War Contracts Subcommittee. He therefore submitted to this subcommittee a rough draft of a legislative measure designed to have the government provide for a $40-billion level of capital investment every year. The subcommittee forwarded this proposal to the various government agencies. Some of them assumed that Patton meant to rely on the generating power of capital investment as the sole source of economic activity. Others felt the $40-billion figure did not necessarily represent the precisely correct amount of investment which might be necessary to secure full employment in any given year, and some felt that fiscal policy, wage levels, foreign trade and other matters should also be dealt with. As a result of these criticisms the original draft was broadened.

Its present form is the proposed full-employment bill which was brought forcibly to public attention by newspaper stories on December 18. When both The New York Times and PM give a bill a big front-page play on the same day, there must be something to it. The President's figure of 60 million jobs and Senator Murray's full-employment bill of 1945 have in them great thought-provoking power. I am sure there are many improvements which must be made in the phraseology and content of the proposal, but the Murray bill does have the supreme merit of focusing attention on the key spot.

This is not the occasion for any detailed discussion of the legislative, administrative and economic features of this bill. In brief, the bill declares it to be the national policy to obtain as much employment as possible

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through private enterprise and in addition to provide for sufficient desirable government programs to ensure the jobs necessary for all who want to work. It calls for setting up an annual nation's budget for jobs in addition to the annual federal budget. It calls for estimating the number of jobs needed during the ensuing year or years to provide full employment, and for estimating the gross national product or total expenditures at the expected level of prices by business, consumers and government required to provide that total number of jobs. It further calls for estimating the prospective volume of investment and other expenditures by business, consumers and government, including expenditures in foreign trade. In case the prospective expenditures are likely to fall short, government is directed first to encourage increased private employment, and then, if necessary, a general program of increased federal expenditures to make up the difference, these expenditures to include assistance to business, useful public works, public services for health, education, slum clearance, conservation and development of natural resources, and other programs.

I find in this proposed bill something that has hitherto been lacking in most of our postwar planning: Namely, a clear understanding of the necessity for active interplay between the executive and the legislative branches of our government. The bill recognizes the key role of Congress in determining our basic national policies. At the same time it provides a method of dramatizing economic programs, of raising to the level of "high politics" the economic deliberations of our President and of the members of our Senate and House of Representatives. Under this bill, there would inevitably be basic disagreements among various political groups as to how much emphasis should be put upon measures to stimulate private enterprise and how much emphasis upon direct federal investment. There would inevitably be conflicts between the President and many vocal groups in the Congress. In actuality, the common man would have no guarantee of his right to a job unless he were politically organized to see to it that his President and his Congress adopted the specific policies and the specific programs that would actually assure full employment. Which is just as it should be.

Under the bill, however, if the wrong policies are adopted, it would be infinitely easier for the average man and the average woman to point a finger at the political leader or the political group responsible for those policies. In short, the proposed National Production and Employment Budget would provide a method of political accountability to the people of our country—a yardstick by which the common man could measure the extent to which he has been properly served by his representatives in the government.

With the bill in operation, both government and business would be under the necessity of informing the public much more promptly of forthcoming fiscal policy. Business for its sake needs prompt information as to government policies. Likewise government needs prompt information as to future investment plans of business. The bookkeeping of future investment in both fields can be of the greatest value in molding government policies and removing business uncertainty. Specifically, I think that the full-employment bill might well be amended to provide that tax measures are always to be enacted by June 30 of each year, so that business can know in advance what the fiscal policy of the government is really going to be.

Inadequacies and gaps in our statistical information should not deter us from making full use of what we have in relation to emerging economic policy. I have always been a believer in exact and complete data, but much progress in policy making can be achieved by the use of statistics for operating purposes that may be only 80 to 90-percent complete.

Economists, working on national income and national expenditures, seem to be moving in the same direction in various parts of the world. For example, the same line of thought contained in the full-employment bill is emerging also in both England and Australia. In both these countries we find the same emphasis on the public responsibility for maintaining a high level of general purchasing power; and the same concern with the three chief sources of expenditures for funds and services—namely, the consuming public, private business and government. There is even emerging a common pattern in the statistical lingo and in the handling of the basic facts with regard to consumers' purchases, business investment in plant and equipment, and government expenditures for ordinary administrative purposes, for war purposes and for developmental purposes.

Sir William Beveridge has just published a report on "Full Employment in a Free Society" which I think transcends in importance his masterpiece on social security two years ago. Social-security programs, desirable as they are, constitute a minor part of the total stream of purchasing power required to sustain a high level of production and employment. I quote two paragraphs from his new book. The first deals with responsibility, the other with method—a new type of budget.

Bear in mind that this report is based on long study of British prewar and war experience. With regard to state responsibility, Beveridge says:

> Employment depends on outlay. Full employment cannot be attained unless outlay in total is sufficient to set up a demand for the whole of the labor that is available for employment. . . . During war a large part of the total outlay is undertaken directly by the state. During peace the bulk of the outlay can, and in a free society will, continue to be private. But the ultimate responsibility for seeing that outlay as a whole, taking public and private outlay together,

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is sufficient to set up a demand for all the labor seeking employment, must be made by the state, because no other authority or person has the requisite powers. No private enterprise can survey the whole field of industry or ensure at all times a demand for all that industry can produce at a price covering its costs. No private enterprise can make finance its servant rather than its master. The outlay of every person or authority other than the state is limited rigidly by the financial resources of that person or authority. The central proposition of this Report is that the responsibility of ensuring at all times outlay sufficient in total to employ all the available manpower in Britain should formally be placed by the people of Britain upon the state. That first and foremost is what is meant by adopting a national policy of full employment.

So much for the Beveridge ideas on governmental responsibility.

With regard to the new type of budget, he says:

The instrument by which the state has influenced outlay in the past has been the annual budget presented, usually about April of each year, by the Chancellor of the Exchequer. This budget has determined directly the scale of public outlay undertaken by the central government; it has to a very large extent determined the outlay of local authorities; by the taxation proposed it has influenced both the extent and the direction of outlay by private citizens. It is through the same instrument of public outlay and of taxation that the state in future must pursue its new objective of adequate total outlay. Adoption of a national policy of full employment means a revolution in national finance—a new type of budget introduced by a Minister who, whether or not he continues to be called Chancellor of the Exchequer, is a Minister of National Finance.

In Australia the head of their Ministry of Postwar Reconstruction, Dr. H. C. Coombs, has adopted very much the same approach. In a recent lecture on "Problems of a High Employment Economy," he states that the appropriate policy of government would appear to be as follows:

(1) To determine a basic public investment program, including all works which it considers of sufficient urgency to be undertaken whatever the level of private investment.

(2) To discover from private enterprise the scope of their plans.

(3) If these two programs are judged insufficient, to supplement them by:

(a) further investment by private enterprise prepared at the request of and perhaps assisted by the government; and/or

(b) the inclusion of projects for public investment of lesser urgency than the basic program already included.

(4) To have ready numbers of emergency works which could be readily put into operation to supplement the planned program if it proves insufficient.

As the common man, the economist and the statesman look toward the future, they know that supreme emphasis must be placed on full use of all resources of men, nature and technology to raise the standard of living of all the world. Both the scientist and the statistician know the productive potentialities are enormous. And this knowledge must make for daring economic projections and bold statesmanship to bring them about. On the statistical side we must have the courage of certain governmental economists who, back in 1940 when most of us thought a $100 billion output of goods and services was beyond the realm of the probable, cited a firm statistical base for thinking that within two years it was physically and technologically possible to raise our annual output to the present equivalent of nearly $200 billion.

Almost no one believed them. The war has proved them right. Contrast their imaginative daring with the fearful, halting attitude of certain nostalgic editorial writers or with those who would have us wait until unemployment is upon us before taking coördinated, preventive measures. Not in such a spirit shall we solve the very great problems of the postwar years.

The war in Europe and in the Pacific has yet to be won and that task must continue as the first preoccupation of our hands, hearts and minds. Nevertheless, the Seventy-ninth Congress will undoubtedly carry on its shoulders the responsibility for devising full-employment legislation. Looking ahead to the day when Congress sees definite signs of peace, the economists must anticipate the types of statistics which will inevitably be required. To anticipate the congressional need accurately, the statisticians must of necessity acquaint themselves with all that the economists of the Anglo-Saxon and European world have learned as a result of World War II and the depression following World War I. They must meet with forward-looking congressmen who are anxious to move with speed when the time comes. They must meet with those business, farm and labor leaders who are eager to see the United States go ahead with full steam. In the economy of the future the only true national deficit will be labor unemployed, and statistical terminology will be more and more concerned with the full use of our resources.

I have given you examples of very specific policy proposals made here and abroad for achieving full employment. As I have said, I am not here concerned with the administrative mechanics of a full-employment policy, but rather with the principles it should follow. Whether or not we formalize the nation's budget, we must adopt the idea it represents. The essential idea is that the federal government is ultimately responsible for full employment and can discharge its responsibility only by planning in advance to synchronize all of its programs with the programs of private enterprise so that the whole national income will be maintained at the full-employment level.

H. A. WALLACE

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What Do We Want in Europe?

As the war in Europe reaches a climax, and the unsettled problems of our times rise to haunt us in liberated areas, the need of clarifying this country's foreign policy becomes of importance not only for peoples abroad whose fate will be affected by our decisions or lack of them, but also for Americans who have a desire to know the use the United Nations will make of common victory. Citizens are trying to define for themselves, and asking the government to define, the aims of the United States in Europe. Do we have objectives of our own, or do we merely react, favorably or unfavorably as the case may be, to those sought by Britain and Russia? Do we have interests in common with Europe—or is it true, as George Washington said in a phrase now widely quoted by isolationists, that "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation"?

To answer these questions it is imperative to rid ourselves of certain preconceptions that often becloud discussions of American foreign policy. President Roosevelt, in his message to Congress, referred to some of them, but they deserve further analysis. The most persistent among them is the notion that the United States, while fighting as a member of a military coalition, retains a completely free hand in formulating its policy on any political or economic issue that may arise in Europe. This is obviously not the case. Political and economic issues are inextricably linked with problems of military operations, and at least as long as the war goes on, our foreign policy, like our military policy, has to be determined in concert with our allies. To act in concert is to seek, not the perfect solution advocated by this or that nation, but a compromise between conflicting interests. We cannot insist that the European countries should carry out policies we consider desirable unless we are ready to work with them in making such policies effective.

What Are Our Motives? – Our tendency to admonish Britain, and less frequently Russia, in lofty moral tones is due to the belief that the United States alone is guided by idealistic considerations, as contrasted with the sordid motives of other nations. No one familiar with this country can doubt the genuine desire of Americans to act in a spirit of justice toward other nations, and their hope that less fortunately situated peoples will some day enjoy all the advantages of our way of life. This aspiration toward ideal settlements of international problems is responsible for current discouragement over the prospect that the Atlantic Charter may not be applied in Poland and Greece. But our tendency to demand perfect solutions of international problems constitutes a real threat to postwar stability. Then, when our unilateral standard of perfection is not attained, we refuse, in disillusionment, to accept some practicable compromise. Have we any right to assume that other peoples are never inspired by idealistic considerations? Of course they are. It is true that the United States, once it had incorporated all the territory it needed on this continent within its boundaries, has been far less concerned with territorial aggrandizement than the nations of Europe, but is this not partly at least because it has not been subjected to the dangers and temptations all too familiar to Europeans? And are not some Americans hoping to take as many islands in the Pacific as possible to discourage possible future aggression by Japan?

But, some people might say, why should the United States expose itself to the temptations of this sinful world when, if it lived in isolation, it might well succeed in remaining virtuous? The answer, obviously, is that our situation is no longer peculiar. The very fact that American armies can be transported overseas to invade the continent of Europe is incontrovertible proof, as Walter Lippmann has pointed out, that a similar attack could some day be made on the United States. It was primarily to avert the dangers of attack on our soil that this country went to war against Germany—not to alter the political and economic structure of European countries or to redraw their boundaries. The perfectionists who are ready to throw up the sponge because everything in Europe is not happening according to the Atlantic Charter have lost sight of the original reason why Americans are fighting on that continent. Our primary objective in this war will be attained if we and the other United Nations can inflict a decisive defeat on Germany.

Our Political Objectives. – The military defeat of Germany, however, will not achieve our second main objective, which has developed as a result of our war experience—and that is to create conditions under which no nation can resort to aggression in the future, and thus make it necessary for the United States to face another holocaust. To achieve this second objective, we shall have to rid ourselves of the notion that participation by this country in military operations overseas involves no responsibility on our part for their political, economic or social consequences. It is this notion of ours which creates the widest gulf between the United States and Europe. The Europeans, obviously, cannot leave the continent once the war is over, as American forces can do. Russia cannot turn her back on the affairs of a continent of which she is a part. Britain no longer has any illusions about her capacity to escape the consequences of events in Europe.

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The moment we recognize that we do have a direct interest in the political and economic consequences of our military operations we shall develop an entirely different, and far more responsible, attitude toward Europe. What happens in Greece or Poland will then no longer be merely the subject matter of moral admonitions to Britain or Russia, or excited round-by-round reporting by radio commentators. We shall have to take our share of responsibility for the practical handling of these problems—and shall then see they are not so simple as we have assumed.

Why Isolationism Is Impossible. – Many Americans, however, who are entirely willing to have the United States fight Germany and Japan to the death are still unwilling to have this country embark on a policy of lasting collaboration with other nations. This attitude cannot fail to discourage Europe and to foster the very kind of unilateral or regional security measures that we deplore. The Europeans know, from the experience of two wars, that sooner or later the United States will find it to its interest to intervene on the side of Britain. But they also know that this will only happen in "extraordinary emergencies," to quote George Washington. Meanwhile, they have to bear the brunt of aggression, losing their men and dissipating their economic substance, only to have the United States come in at the finish and admonish war-weary Europeans to abide by the highest standards of a nonexistent international morality.

Our attitude toward Europe might seem to indicate that Americans have always wanted to live in isolation. Yet the United States at no time in its history has been, or has wanted to be, completely isolated—if by isolation is meant the nonexistence of contacts with other nations. This country has always had ties of commerce or sentiment with nations all over the globe, and has not hesitated to intervene abroad whenever its interests in these respects seemed to be affected. What many Americans have not recognized, or have recognized only dimly, is that the United States also had political and military interests outside its borders which cannot be arbitrarily separated from its commercial or sentimental concern in other nations. Our main problem in foreign policy, then, is not to make a choice between isolation and intervention, but between unilateral intervention for the protection solely of what we regard as national interests, and collaboration with other countries in promoting the security and welfare of the international community.

For Democratic Intervention. – But right here we come to another confused notion, so well reflected in the statement made by Secretary of State Stettinius on December 5 concerning Britain's policy in Italy and Greece. In this statement the Secretary criticized Britain's intervention in the two countries, and gave the impression that the United States was above such sordid things and was pursuing a policy of non-intervention. How can it be said that this country is not intervening in Europe? Can we really expect to draw a line between military intervention, on the one hand, and its effects on the liberated countries and Germany on the other? No purpose is served by pretending that the United States alone of the great powers virtuously abstains from all intervention in the affairs of other countries. A great power affects the affairs of its smaller neighbors by the mere fact that it exists. Right now we are intervening in Argentina by the withdrawal of our ambassador, the freezing of Argentine funds in this country, the restrictions on exports to Buenos Aires. What we really mean is that there is a stronger incentive for us to intervene in Argentina than in Greece or Poland, which is true; but then the reverse is true for Britain and Russia. Moreover, we are just as responsible as the British for such intervention as the Allies have undertaken in Italy and Belgium and, since President Roosevelt has been in personal consultation with Churchill and Stalin, we cannot wash our hands entirely of what is happening in Greece and Poland.

What troubles our conscience is that Britain and Russia are resorting to what we call, in derogatory tones, "power politics." But, as an English newspaper put it, do we want "powerless politics"? Any individual or nation who is seeking to achieve political ends is always using some form of power—the power of arms, or economic favors, or ideas. We can question the ends Britain or Russia are seeking to achieve. That is quite another matter. But we would find it much easier to deal with other nations if we stopped taking a holier-than-thou attitude. Non-intervention, in any case, is itself a form of intervention. The so-called non-intervention of Britain and the United States in the Spanish civil war facilitated the activities of Germany and Italy, and constituted intervention in favor of Franco.

American Responsibility. – Instead of contrasting our hands-off policy (largely mythical) with the intervention of other great powers, why not take the bull by the horns and decide that the United States will use its enormous influence, greatly enhanced by the war, to intervene on behalf of the forces in Europe that are favorable to what we regard as democracy? In fact, without intervention by the United States at least in the form of relief, and certainly of moral support, it is entirely possible that these forces may not prove able "to work out their problems of government along democratic lines," as Mr. Stettinius hopes. But before we can do anything on the continent, we must ask ourselves what objectives we want to achieve in Europe? Our two main objectives, as pointed out above, are to win a decisive victory and to use this victory for the purpose of creating a system of collective security. On

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these two objectives there has been a striking degree of agreement among Americans, and no important differences exist between us and our Allies. It is on the methods to be used to achieve security that differences have emerged—and the closer we come to the ending of hostilities, the sharper they will become.

To put it in a nutshell, Britain and Russia are determined to protect themselves against the possible renewal of German aggression—with our coöperation if possible, without it if necessary. It is not, as some commentators have hinted, that the British and Russians have not read the Connally resolution. They have read it, and they have read reams of other resolutions and statements, official and unofficial, concerning our postwar plans. But man cannot live by plans alone—least of all in Europe, whose economic resources have been destroyed, and whose moral values have been sapped by years of German rule. Knowledge of the long and possibly inconclusive process that must take place before any document creating an effective international organization can be approved by the Senate haunts Europeans who cannot forget the experience of 1919. And meanwhile myriad problems that we had thought could be dealt with in a postwar settlement must be acted upon without delay. Will the United States, this year, take the decision from which it shrank in 1919, and accept participation in an international organization of the type outlined in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals? Even if it does, the United Nations urgently need in the meantime an interim political council, a Combined Board, which could handle the problems of liberated Europe as they arise, instead of letting them fester until dangerous cauterization becomes necessary.

For a Democratic Europe. – What kind of Europe do we want to emerge from the war? What kind of Europe shall we be prepared to help defend, in our own interest, against any attempt at aggression? It is impossible to expect any country to advocate the creation abroad of a political and economic system which a majority of its people do not favor at home. No one is surprised to find that Russia does not sponsor a program of capitalism in the countries of Eastern Europe and the Balkans she is helping to liberate. No one should be surprised if the United States government, which President Roosevelt himself has described as "a little left of center," does not demand that all liberated countries shall have Communist regimes. But a country like the United States, nurtured on rebellion against monarchy, cannot consistently advocate the restoration of monarchical governments, especially if they are opposed by their own peoples, or foster reactionary movements for the purpose of checking any swing toward the Left. On this point, our prevailing public opinion agrees with that of the British people. Nor can a predominantly Protestant nation support without question proposals for postwar Europe that would attempt to counterbalance Russia by a coalition of conservative Catholic regimes. On this point public opinion here, although in the past critical of Russia's attitude toward religion and private property, is opposed to attempts to form an anti-Russian coalition. Our task is to maintain the middle ground we now occupy, and use our influence, which for some unfathomable reason is constantly underestimated by Americans, to reconcile the interests and policies of Britain and Russia, and at the same time to aid the small nations so far as possible.

The tide in Europe is running in the direction of a left-of-center democracy, shaped by leaders who have found it possible, even under the strain and stress of war and of resistance movements, to reconcile religious convictions with social progress. In this trend there is nothing inimical to the United States, and nothing with which we shall not find ourselves in agreement in the large, much as we may differ on details of policy. We did not enter Europe to provoke revolution. But neither did we enter Europe to prevent reforms that may, in the eyes of many people, be equivalent to revolution. It is to our political and economic interest that Europe should be modernized as rapidly as possible. Then it will be better able to defend itself against possible future pressure by Germany; and it will offer a more promising market for our exports. The desire expressed in this country for return to "free enterprise" may at some points conflict with the plans of leading Europeans for controlled reconstruction of the continent. But, by a curious paradox, the best way to expand our private enterprise through exports to other nations will be to encourage the efforts of Europeans to streamline their economies, even if this can best be done by a measure of socialization.

It is to our interest, too, that Europe should become as politically united as possible, for political unity would not only strengthen the continent, but could also bring reduction, and eventually elimination, of tariff barriers and other restrictions that have so hampered its economic advancement. A weak and disunited continent which would be dominated by either Britain or Russia, or else transformed into a battleground of the two powers, each of which would then seek to win the military and industrial support of Germany, is definitely not in the interest of the United States. But unless the European nations get back on their feet, and are encouraged to develop their economies, they will inevitably gravitate for protection toward either Britain or Russia—and, if disappointed in these powers, may ultimately even turn to Germany. Only a Europe whose political and economic conditions will have become more or less equalized will be strong enough to collaborate with a Germany purged of Nazism without fear of German domination.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

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Social Security in Britain

II. *Why Full Employment Is Preferable*

SECOND only to the military operations, speculation about the postwar economic situation occupies the mind of the British people. All kinds of questions are being asked, most of them honestly, some of them carefully calculated to raise doubts about our future ability to maintain, much less improve, our living standards before the war. The Tories, of course, are well in front in the game of making our flesh creep, though there are some Labor men who seem to be slipping up on the first principles of economics, orthodox as well as Socialist. The main purpose is to damp down the ardor of expectancy of a better life after the war, created to a large extent by the same people, who now intone Woe! woe! every time they open their mouths in public. As the fighting draws to an end in Europe, and the lavish promises held out in the black days now fail to be fulfilled, the word has gone out from the City, the insurance offices and the Federation of British Industries to create an atmosphere of foreboding about the economic and financial prospects ahead of us.

The state of mind produced by this sort of propaganda lay at the back of the debate in the House of Commons early in November on the Social Insurance White Paper of the government. Over and over again the question was asked: "Can we afford it?" Fear, whether self-induced or implanted in your mind by interested suggestion, is never a good logician. *There never can be a question of whether we can afford social security.*

It is not an additional burden on the community. By its very nature it is a redistribution of what we already possess. It is a transfer of income from the fortunate to the less fortunate, and is therefore always a self-balancing principle. Contributions are collected into a common pool and paid out to those who satisfy the conditions of benefit. The making of a warship or a tank is a definite reduction in the wealth of the community, but free milk for children is not. If the supply of milk is limited, then somebody else goes with less.

The community can have all the social insurance it likes, for by its very nature it is merely a reduction of somebody's claim to consumption to add to that of some other person. The question, "Can we afford it?" is therefore quite beside the point.

The doubt raised by the question is particularly misleading in connection with the insurance proposals of the government, for it creates the impression that they involve a transfer of wealth from the well-to-do to the poorer members of the community. In fact, they do nothing of the kind. An examination of the figures shows that it is roughly a redistribution of income within the working class, if we use that term for those with incomes of, say, less than $2,000 a year.

The increased cost of the government's proposals is $896 million. Who pays it? The workers will pay, by increased contributions, $436 million. Thus, at once, half the additional cost will fall on the workers.

The increase in the employers' contribution is $148 million. Who pays that? Even in the days of highly competitive capitalism, a uniform increase in the cost of production of this nature was often passed on to the consumer. Of course, this was never wholly the case, otherwise we should fall into the error of assuming a fixed "wage fund" for the workers, which could not be added to by any device. But, in most of British industry, competitive conditions no longer prevail, and an increase in the cost of production, occasioned by stepping up employers' contributions, can be, and is, at once passed on to the price of goods and services.

As those below $2,000 a year form the overwhelming majority of the nation, this means that the workers pay the employers' contribution as well as their own. The rise in prices may not be very large—something in the order of one to two percent, perhaps, but in the aggregate it reaches the total of $148 million. Anyway, the consumer pays, and except in his microscopic capacity as a personal consumer, the employer is exempt.

The remaining $312 million of the additional cost of the scheme is paid by the Exchequer; that is, by the taxpayer. Here it would appear the rich are caught at last and made to pay for social insurance. Nevertheless, once more the sieve principle operates. In 1938 the total tax revenue was $3,552 million. Of that sum $1,484 million was raised by indirect taxes. In other words, 40 percent of the total revenue came from taxes which increased the prices of goods consumed largely by the poor. The workers are caught again.

Sixty percent of the taxpayers' contribution of $312 million is left, and at last it seems the rich are drawn in, albeit for a comparatively small contribution. Yet, here again, they manage to slip some of the burden from their shoulders. In the debate Sir William Jowitt stated that of that remaining 60 percent one-third comes from incomes of less than $5,000 a year under present conditions of taxation. *If these conditions continue after the war, the rich will have escaped all but a negligible contribution to the scheme of social insurance about which they have been making such a fuss.*

It is essential to get these facts clear in our minds in order to appreciate what is happening. In the past

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the labor movement has called for a system of social security for two main reasons. One, to assist the individual in the misfortunes of life, sickness, old age, widowhood, unemployment, etc. Second, to bring about a transfer of wealth from the rich to the poor so as to mitigate the consequences of inequalities of income. The government scheme partly satisfies the first condition by enabling the better-off workers to come to the help of the worse-off. The poor help the poorer. But it does substantially nothing to meet the second condition. The scheme leaves inequalities of wealth where they were.

So far I have dealt only with the way in which the burden of the increased cost of the new scheme is distributed. What of the total scheme? What does social security cost the community in terms of the national income? You would gather from the speeches of the Tories that it is colossal. In 1938 the total cost, including Workmen's Compensation, was $1,280 million. The national income was $18,400 million. Social security cost us seven percent of the national income in 1938. Not much to boast about, is it?

At present our national income is over $32 billion, the rise partly reflecting higher prices. If we express the total cost of social insurance as a proportion of that figure, it comes to eight percent. After all the hullabaloo, we are promised a rise of one percent, and, as I have shown, practically the whole of the increase is paid by the workers themselves. No wonder the government has come to the conclusion that we can afford it.

Apart from the failure to adjust social inequalities, the method of financing the scheme has evil consequences for the future development of social insurance if the same method is followed. Every increase in benefit will involve additional increases in the contributions made by the workers, which are already extremely heavy. The workers will therefore become the enemies of further improvements. This sets the better-off workers against the poorer, for the latter can gain only at the expense of the former.

The Tories appreciate this. Many of them are already smugly saying that benefits cannot be increased because the workers will not stand for higher contributions. Of course they won't. This fact more than any other illustrates my opening contention that the whole scheme is nothing but a transfer of income, which makes nonsense of the question, "Can we afford it?" Unfortunately, it is a transfer among the poor and not from the rich to the poor.

But, I may be told, this is only part of the story, for after the war the total national income will be smaller and we shall have less to redistribute among ourselves. Why? Of course we shall not be able to afford this and many other desirable things if we fail to achieve full employment. The total national income will be smaller only if too many of us are unemployed. If we are all unemployed we shall not be able to afford anything.

In his new Report on Employment,[1] Sir William Beveridge deals with that. He calls attention to a fact that Socialists knew all along. In 1938 about 1.7 million were unemployed. If they had been working, the national income would have been increased by $2 billion. The gain at present prices would be $2.7 billion. That is exactly the cost of social security. *In other words, full employment after the war could give us the social-security proposals of the government without costing us a single penny. Let every worker keep that in mind every time he looks at his pay envelope and sees the heavy insurance contribution he pays. It is not the cost of social security. It is the price of unemployment, and only part of the price at that.*

The next question is: "Can we achieve full employment?" There is no doubt of it in the mind of Sir William, or in that of any reputable economist. Echoing every Socialist for the last fifty years, Sir William says bluntly that unemployment is caused by the uneven distribution of spending power. Spending power is saved in the pockets of the rich and lacking in the pockets of the poor. The demand for goods is not sufficient to keep industry—and therefore the workers—fully employed. From this analysis Sir William comes to the simple and logical conclusion that taxation should be so used as to redistribute the national income in such a fashion as to put the necessary money in the hands of the spenders.

If private enterprise refuses to work under that process—and it would—then he suggests the gap should be made good by the government borrowing and spending the difference between private spending and the amount necessary to keep industry going at full pressure. The third principle he suggests is that, as a normal procedure, the government should always spend by public action the sum necessary to keep all the factors of production in full operation.

It is no part of my business here to make comment on the wisdom or the practicability of Sir William Beveridge's proposals. That we shall have to leave for further examination. The point I wish to make is simply this: The technical, political and administrative means for full employment and social insurance are present. The social will also is there.

The question is, therefore, not, Can we afford it? It is, are we prepared to allow private enterprise to cheat us of the things that are so manifestly within our grasp? In short, can we afford private enterprise any longer?

ANEURIN BEVAN

This is the second of two articles on social security in Great Britain. The first, by Sir Ronald Davison, appeared in the issue of January 1. — THE EDITORS

[1] Full Employment in a Free Society, by Sir William Beveridge (to be published on February 26 by W. W. Norton and Company. See also Mr. Wallace's reference on page 139).

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Washington Notes

Before the Big Three Meet

THE MAN who carries America's hopes and fears to the conference with Churchill and Stalin is paralyzed from the waist down. I watched Roosevelt at his final third-term press conference, and at his Inaugural. He looks calm, confident, robust. At his desk, he tipped his jaunty ivory cigarette-holder at the ceiling. He whetted his wits leisurely against correspondents' steel-edged questions with a lubricant of laughter. Circular study walls show prints of old New York, the Hudson, ship pictures. His big desk has a brief orderly territory in front, bounded on either side by nickel vacuum carafe and telephone; then, rearwards, an always encroaching clutter of mascots, gimcracks, Democratic donkeys, and so on. The healthy bronze color of his face runs right up into his thinning hair. He wears a natty polka-dot bow-tie; a black signet ring on his left little finger.

At the Inaugural I shall never forget that queer instant when Jimmie Roosevelt and an attendant suddenly popped the President into sight from his wheel chair to the speaker's podium, one of FDR's powerful arms over each shoulder. He stood for the speech, hunched to let his weight fall on his right arm. During the grueling campaign Roosevelt stood erect only twice (supported by braces) for brief speeches; all the others were made seated. Yet Roosevelt is today, I would guess, at the top of his form. He spoke firmly the 500-word literary gem that (whoever helped write it) will be carved up in marble somewhere, sometime.

If Senator Brewster, who beat his breast over Stettinius' supposed not going to the Big Three conference, would read this column, he wouldn't make such mistakes. Using the air, Stettinius should be able to get back from the Big Three gathering to the February conference of Pan American ministers at Mexico City in good time, as I explained.

Roosevelt would like to take a plane-load of correspondents with him, but it will depend on Stalin and Churchill. More than these two, Roosevelt needs (and knows that he needs) favorable publicity to carry America with him on the immediate sequel of a successful Big Three meeting—completion of the Dumbarton Oaks agreement and passage by the Senate.

I have good reason to suppose Roosevelt carries to the conference a determination to deal sternly with Germany. There has been no essential retreat from the proposals, presented as a discussion point by Morgenthau to Roosevelt and Churchill at Quebec, when Eden flew over specially for the conference. The proposals were then considered sympathetically. Later, in somewhat warped form, their tenor was revealed through a Washington "leak," based on interdepartmental jealousy. They contemplate transferring outlying German industrial regions to contiguous nations, stripping and exporting part of Germany's industrial plant, maintaining a firm police force. Soviet views are, presumably, even more sweeping. Already, I understand, 150,000 to 200,000 Germans caught by Russians in Rumania have been put into work battalions to help rebuild devastated areas. While the reason for this is understandable enough, and while Mr. Roosevelt still uses these proposals as a basis for discussion, his conversation shows he holds the long-range view that there is no substitute for an international security organization of the Dumbarton Oaks variety, with Germany ultimately a member.

William Batt, director of the American section of the Combined Raw Materials Board, has taken the lead recently in emphasizing the postwar need which the United States has for a strong Britain. Britain simply must have a revived export trade to live; otherwise she is bankrupt, and no nation is going to commit suicide. International peace needs Anglo-American coöperation and there is no other price for that than some accommodation between Britain's need and America's new, super-efficient industrial capacity. Britain's course in Italy, Greece, at the Chicago air conference and elsewhere, is largely economic: she wants a closed or protected market until her war-battered industries are refurbished; for converse reasons American business men are demanding free competition in open markets, which is a good slogan, and ideal in the long run, but which may bring a head-on collision with Britain just when we need coöperation. Military authorities support the "strong-Britain" thesis for reasons of pure American self-interest.

What isn't understood, however, in America—much less in Britain—is the hideous inefficiency of British production. The war accentuated this, but it started long before. The blunt, brutal fact is that Britain is a quarter-century behind. Examples: 1. Textiles: The USA has 600,000 automatic looms, Britain only 14,000; the USA produces 10 billion yards of textiles from 22 million cotton spindles, Britain only 1.7 billion yards from 36 million spindles. 2. Coal: Britain still forbids the use of electricity in coal mines for reasons of safety, and extracts by pick, shovel and pony cart; America uses automatic cutter, loader and electric train. The British government has refused permission to publish a stark, grim war report by American engineers who surveyed British coal mines. Pit mouths, shafts, tunnels were all found too small for automatic machinery; in other words, the whole British mining structure must be rebored, rebuilt—a matter of two decades. American engineers had no axe to grind; by expensive American surface-strip methods, using American extractive machines rushed over for war purpose (in what is possibly the largest excavating job in the history of mankind), 12 million additional tons of British coal are now being mined annually and used for the Allies. Roosevelt cited this last week as an example of Allied coöperation. But what he didn't say was that American engineers had counted on a 20-million-ton total; they would have got it by our ruthless, beauty-destroying methods which turn a lovely hill into a reeking gravel pit in no time. The British wouldn't stand for it—not even in war. Postwar British coal is going to be expensive; America may undersell it even in the Mediterranean. Add that to the postwar problems. One suggestion I hear seriously made is that modern German machinery might be transferred to Britain and Russia as a new form of reparations; yes, and coal, too.

Washington T. R. B.

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A Communication

Postwar Germany

SIR: The problem of postwar Germany is only a part of the general problem of the postwar community of nations. No terms imposed upon Germany will endure unless they are supported by the firm will of peace-loving nations as united in a constructive peacetime policy as now in their struggle for survival. In its turn, satisfactory settlement of the problem of Germany is one of the main premises of peace for all nations.

Most people will agree with the first premise of durable peace given some time ago in The New Republic: "The aim is neither revenge nor forgiveness . . . it is to prevent the Germans from precipitating another world war at some future time, by whatever means may be appropriate." This premise leads to only one possible solution of the problem of postwar Germany: if the Reich is to be kept from precipitating another war, it must be thoroughly disarmed and deprived of all means for acquiring and producing munitions. In fact, the military disarmament of Germany cannot be completed unless it is combined with *industrial disarmament.*

It is true that under certain conditions Germany might restore her industrial war potential precisely as she restored her military might after the First World War. The difference is, however, in *time.* Because her industrial plant was left intact, Germany was able to start rearming almost immediately after her delegates returned from Versailles. When her neighbors became aware of the danger, the Reich had become too strong to be stopped without great effort. So it got time to carry on its preparations until it was ready to strike.

If the Reich is disarmed but retains all the means for producing munitions, it can rearm in a few years. If the military disarmament is combined with industrial disarmament, the Germans would have to start by rebuilding blast furnaces and steel mills. It would take years before they are able to produce guns, tanks, airplanes and battleships, and Germany would be stopped long before she finishes her preparations.

Let us have no illusions, however. The economic disarmament of a nation like Germany is complicated and difficult. It calls not only for eradicating munitions factories but also for eliminating from the Reich all plants which may serve as camouflage for war production or may be converted for military purposes on short notice. The list of such plants is so long that economic disarmament necessarily entails economic reconstruction of Germany and reshaping her relations with other countries.

The main objections to such measures—apart from an appeal to "justice for all"—may be summarized under five heads.

1. The control argument: "The industrial disarmament of Germany cannot be enforced without a cumbersome system of controls over all its economy." This is true, but not an objection. Far-reaching controls are indispensable even to keep Germany from building tanks, submarines and flying bombs. If such controls are impossible, a new war five or ten years hence is unavoidable. Moreover, control will be the easier the less the heavy industry left to Germany. Control will be largely simplified if the Reich is forbidden to produce basic war materials, such as alloy steel, aluminum, and so on, and is permitted to operate only a few machinery plants licensed by the Allies and located close to the boundaries within easy reach of fortresses on the other side of the frontier.

2. The resentment argument: "The Germans will resent the loss of their factories." True, but the Germans will resent *any* peace resulting from a lost war. Their resentment will be the more dangerous the greater the means they retain for preparing a war of revenge. The danger will be reduced if the Germans learn to understand that any attempt to rearm will be fatal.

3. The dislocation argument: "Elimination of heavy industries in Germany will cause serious economic dislocations in Germany and other countries." This is true if "dislocation" means any deviation from the prewar pattern. In fact, the argument rests on the assumption that the world has to return to the prewar distribution of economic activities among the nations. It is obvious, however, that a new distribution of mills and factories and a new pattern of foreign trade is preferable to the old pattern that has accounted for two world wars.

4. The argument of economic progress: "Germany's contribution to the economic progress of the world will be jeopardized by the destruction of its heavy industries." This argument is countered by the question whether German technical achievements are worth the price which humanity paid for them. A major war each 25 years!

5. The argument of the economic feasibility: "Germany cannot exist without heavy industries. Industrial disarmament would condemn its people to misery and starvation." This is the only strong argument, and it deserves closer examination.

The validity of this argument depends upon three premises: that the Germans can produce on their soil only a small part of the food and raw materials they need; that their only means for covering their imports in food, feed stuffs and industrial raw materials is the export of iron and steel products, machinery and chemicals; and that the economic system of Germany is fixed by the factors of population, soil, climate and natural resources, and no other economic system is possible within the Reich. None of these premises stands the test of fact.

The Reich possesses a highly developed agriculture susceptible of further expansion. Before the war, the value of its imports in food and kindred goods, including coffee, tea, cocoa, beverages and tobacco, was not more than 2 to 2.5 percent of its national income, or 10 to 12.5 percent of the value of its agricultural output. The need for agricultural imports will probably increase because of territorial adjustments and repatriation of the German population of areas taken from the Reich. On the other hand, such need may be curtailed by agrarian reform, intensification of agricultural production and utilization of areas which have been serving industrial and military purposes. It may be further reduced by adjustment of the national diet, not necessarily to the level developed by the German scientists for "inferior" races.

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It is true that iron and steel products, machinery, tools and chemicals predominated in German exports before the war. Industrial disarmament of Germany would automatically ban these items from her foreign trade. In addition, however, the Reich exported fabrics, apparel, leather, furs, furniture, paper, glass, china, watches, musical instruments, toys and many other finished goods. Expanded production of these goods could cover German imports of agricultural products.

By the end of this war, the heavy industry which was the backbone of the German economic and military system will be hardly more than heaps of rubble. The Germans will have to work hard to rebuild their homes and railroads, to restore their cities and villages, and to resume agricultural and industrial production. Their standard of living will necessarily drop in this period to a comparatively low level —perhaps to the level which their scientists described as appropriate for French, Italians, Poles, Russians and Greeks. But the Germans should be allowed to improve their economic conditions, making use of all their technical abilities. The transition period will be very long if they are permitted to rebuild the Babylon tower of their heavy industry. It will be comparatively short if they work within a less ambitious framework and develop a plant to produce butter rather than guns.

The restrictions imposed on Germany can be at once severe and generous: Germany can be permitted to have every opportunity to expand agricultural production and develop consumer-goods industries; she can have free access to the world markets for raw materials required by these industries and access to the markets for her exports. But, at the same time, no camouflaged munitions factories on German soil—no steel mills, no shipyards, no airplane factories, no chemical factories that may be converted to the production of explosives, no shops using aluminum or hard steel. Germans need not be barred from using transportation facilities of other nations for foreign trade, but no German airplane in the sky and no German ship on the ocean. They can be permitted to purchase electric power from abroad in accordance with their real needs, but within the Reich no power plant that might be used for war need. The Germans should be encouraged to restore their roads and bridges, but spared the waste of time and labor needed to restore those superhighways which serve military purposes and might again lure them to a disastrous adventure. They can be encouraged to expand their production and trade, but under strict international control.

Under such controls, Germans as individuals will regain freedom—perhaps for the first time in their history. They will be freed from the dreams of world domination which have obsessed them since the middle of the last century, and from the fear of new wars which haunted them. German farmers will be freed from the domination of land owners, German workers will be able to throw off the yoke of the captains of heavy industries. The new system will make possible the rise of democratic forces in the Reich and will pave the way for the reëducation of the German people in the spirit of our modern civilization. In brief, industrial disarmament will mark the end of the Iron Age in Germany and—perhaps a century hence—will be recognized by the German scientists as the most salutary turning-point in the history of the Reich.

These brief notes do not pretend to outline a program. Nor do they pretend to document the statements made. They aim only to remind the reader of a few facts which indicate the direction in which solution of the problem of of Germany should be sought.

Washington, D. C. W. S. WOYTINSKY

[Readers should be warned that Mr. Woytinsky's letter is a general summary of his position rather than a specific reply to the editorial to which he refers. Most of the phrases which he puts in quotation marks are not quotations from the editorial, and he fails to reply to some of the arguments made by the editors.

An example is his sentence, "The Germans will resent the loss of their factories." To this he correctly replies that they will resent any peace terms. Our argument was much more realistic than this. Germans will not in any case be able to express resentment by a new war for many years. It is important that they shall not wish to fight one by the time they have recovered, as well as that they shall not have the means to do so. A permanently impoverished and oppressed German people would not merely resent the peace terms now, but would be continually spurred to accept a dictatorial and revengeful leadership.

In general, Mr. Woytinsky presents what seems to us two untenable assumptions—one expressed, the other unexpressed. The first is that a highly industrialized nation would be better off without heavy industry. If so, why not destroy Gary and Birmingham (England)? The second is that the Germans will be forever incapable of refraining from aggression if they have a heavy industry, and that the present war was caused by the fact that they had one. This version of history and politics is now current, but surely no greater over-simplification was ever made by anyone who accepts the standards of science.

We invite our readers to compare this communication with our editorial, for a fuller statement of our difference. – THE EDITORS]

The Bandwagon

Churchill characterized the ELAS forces in Greece as "Trotskyite" Communists, and accused them of being "even dirtier than the Germans." – *From The New York Herald Tribune.*

THE RAINCOAT—All over the world people are walking in the rain—in Paris and London and Rome and Moscow, and in our own great cities. Either there are no cars at all, or so few that nobody counts on them any more. The Paris couturiers are facing the fact—no collection is without its raincoat. – *From Harper's Bazaar.*

Sans Peur et Sans Reproche

The outgoing Minister of Information, Liang Han-chao, also said the military situation was "rather grave," but that China was confident of the outcome. Liang declared that in her seven and one-half years of war China had made no political or strategical mistakes. – *AP dispatch from Chungking.*

On the Home Front

There are strong indications in the capital that the nation's millions of people will realize more than ever in the next few

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months that what General Sherman said about war is true. There is evidence the ban on horse racing is to be followed by other bans. – *Charles M. Dean in The Cincinnati Enquirer.*

Our readers are invited to contribute to this column; $1 will be paid for each item used. Address Bandwagon, care of The New Republic. Please enclose the original clipping. – THE EDITORS

Correspondence

Housing After the War

SIR: At war's end the United States will own, in army camp sites, enough good concrete-based housing to accommodate five million persons for 25 years.

The use of these camps for peacetime military training has been suggested, but in an age when the skilled occupations require for training years beyond the normal period for assuming the adult responsibilities of marrying and earning a living, we can ill afford to ask young men for another year. We need young men trained for peace, and young men are in a hurry. Would not a compulsory ROTC serve preparedness well enough?

And there are positive, peacetime uses for housing for five million people. One-third of the nation's population is ill housed. Many camp sites are near enough to cities so that persons resettled there could commute to the work they had previously. Other sites would be suitable for the resettlement of tenant farmers and field hands, who could have a little land for truck gardening, and work in industries which could be located there.

By these means, five million more of our citizens would be living, for peace, in conditions considered minimal for men in war. We should have reduced the potential carriers of diseases science has conquered by five million. We should have increased our healthy, productive population by five million.

HELEN BUGBEE

Chicago, Ill.

What Are Equal Rights for Women?

SIR: It is an astonishing tribute to the power of a good slogan that a proposition as absurd as the so-called Equal Rights Amendment proposed by the Woman's Party should have been given even an ambiguous place in the platforms of the two political parties in the recent election campaign.

Certain members of Congress, covetous of the woman vote in its entirety, point out that the party platforms espoused the causes of "an" amendment, not necessarily "the" amendment advocated by Alice Paul and her political champion, Mrs. Emma Guffey Miller. Obviously they are cherishing the idea that an amendment might be concocted that would deny any distinction between the sexes and, at the same time, preserve the effectiveness of the laws which recognize that such distinctions exist.

While understanding the political embarrassment suffered by these gentlemen, we hope that, with November 7 behind them, they will face the realities of the situation. If the amendment were to be adopted, no law, federal, state or municipal, could make any distinction between men and women—it means that, or it means nothing.

The National Consumers' League has opposed the amendment consistently for more than twenty years chiefly because of what it would do to the hard-won legislation which has succeeded in equalizing somewhat the position of millions of wage-earning women in the labor market, legislation based on intelligent and practical recognition of the fact that women have a less advantageous bargaining position than men; that they fall, generally speaking, into the classification of unskilled or semi-skilled labor; that they are less highly organized than men, and that a large proportion are young women, lacking experience and needing safeguards for future motherhood.

The Woman's Party advocates are against these laws and the amendment they propose would nullify them.

While this is our main objection, the Consumers' League is also concerned about another set of laws, less talked about but equally endangered—those affecting the family directly. Social workers know that the period of a wife's pregnancy is a favorite time for the husband to desert. Could the wife, at that point, be held to be in a position "equal" to that of her husband? Yet the amendment, in the name of a spurious "equality," would either deprive the wife of the right to demand support from her husband or give the husband an equal right to demand that he be supported by his wife—obviously ridiculous, if not calamitous. It would throw into jeopardy laws regarding sexual offenses, the rights of widows to social-security benefits, and other statutes which are an outgrowth of our pattern of social and family life.

Yet, while working this havoc, the amendment would not redress major inequalities persisting today, notably in professional and technical fields of training and practice, since these are mainly matters of tradition and custom rather than of law.

The Consumers' League chiefly regrets that valuable time and energy must be spent in combating the proposal, when so much work needs to be done in legislating for postwar reconstruction and expanded social security; in obtaining state minimum-wage laws, especially for the easily exploitable service trades not covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act; in getting equal-pay-for-equal-work laws (which the amendment would not accomplish); and in the restoration of hours and child-labor standards relaxed during the war emergency.

ELIZABETH S. MAGEE,

Cleveland, O. General Secretary, National Consumers' League

From The New Republic Mail Bag

Mr. Casimir Sieminski, of Swoyerville, Pennsylvania, objects to the editorial on the Polish question (The New Republic, January 8). If the Poles, he writes, "took the eastern provinces in 1920, they took what was rightfully theirs before the Russians grabbed when Poland was partitioned" in 1772 and 1795. He also objects to the statement that some members of the Polish Government-in-Exile hope for Russia's defeat in the war.

Mr. G. Burnstein, of Norristown, Pennsylvania, sends us his own detailed plan for Germany, which provides for an army of occupation, the trial of Nazis and army officers, disarmament, the prohibition of military indoctrination and reparations.

Mrs. F. H. Gray, of Bruni, Texas, suggests the formation of an organization similar to the National Committee to Combat Anti-Semitism, which would promote legislation to enforce the civil rights of Negroes. More than an "act of feeling" is required on the part of white liberals, she says, to fight Jim Crowism.

The League for Industrial Democracy, New York City, sends us an announcement of its fortieth-anniversary dinner, to be held in the Hotel Roosevelt, February 3. The chief speakers will be Upton Sinclair, Frank Scott representing the Coöperative Commonwealth Federation of Canada, and Arthur Creech Jones of London, Member of Parliament and parliamentary private secretary of Ernest Bevin.

The Public Education Association, 745 Fifth Avenue, New York 22, N. Y., in celebration of its fiftieth anniversary, is planning a three months' intensive highlighting of present and postwar educational problems.

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What Ernie Pyle did for GIs abroad, Arthur Miller has done for GIs in boot camp.

Miller toured the world of Army camps to trace the beginnings of the American soldier, to discover the moment when he changes from civilian in uniform to honest-to-god GI. He went because Hollywood was filming Ernie Pyle's *Here Is Your War*, and this time it wanted a war film that was real, a war film that wasn't just a "big, bloody western in uniform." To do justice to a great book, Hollywood wanted the whole picture of Army life, starting with the first bewildering day in boot camp. So Miller went on his journey and came back with this unique report—an honest, heart-warming book that is praised all over the nation.

"If this perfectly grand book is added to Ernie Pyle's *Here Is Your War* and *Brave Men*, even the most assiduous reader will have to go no further for a comprehensive picture of the men who make up our fighting forces."—STANLEY ANDERSON, *Cleveland Press.*

"First-rate. Mr. Miller is an excellent reporter: he has an eye for the little things that give meaning to the big ones...It's as good a picture as you are likely to find (short of joining the Army) of what goes on from draft board to port of embarkation."—HERBERT KUPFERBERG, *N.Y. Herald Tribune.*

"The most terrific war book yet . . . I have not been so shaken by anything written of the war as I have been by *Situation Normal...*"—HELEN BOWER, *Detroit Free Press.*

"Mr. Miller is at his best—and that is really good—when he is describing actual happenings...I have never seen the excitements and bewilderments of basic training better recorded . . . He got to understand tanks better than most writers ('You are in a clothes closet with the breech of a cannon swinging past your head.'). His account of a plane full of paratroops going up for their first jump is almost unbearably detailed and tense."—RUSSELL MALONEY, *N. Y. Times.*

"A fine book, and what it does it does so quietly that the net effect sneaks up on you in that subtle way that has you suddenly reading the last line and then jumping up and clicking your heels in sheer ecstasy."—*Chicago Sun.*

"The most refreshing, convincing and down-to-earth book that has been turned out yet on soldiers and army life."—*St. Louis Star Times.*



by **ARTHUR MILLER**

SITUATION NORMAL...

Reynal and Hitchcock $2.00

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Books in Review

Art for Science's Sake

TWO OF THE DEVELOPMENTS in painting since French Impressionism have been into abstract painting and into the marvelous, irrational or delirious painting done by the surrealists; and this survey[1] is a genial, amateur-mechanics-minded, journalistic account of these two developments in Europe and the United States. I think the survey is very unsatisfactory, but it has one major virtue: it presents ninety-odd paintings by artists from the two main movements in which it seems to me the most advanced painting is being done today; and a few minor ones: Mr. Janis' attitude is unusually non-partisan; he shows a clearer enjoyment than is usually exhibited by critics; and he has as much knowledge of the public's role in art as of the painters'. The text, though, is the most enervating I have ever read, and fails—or hardly tries—to show why the abstract artist feels that realism is a dried-up, repressive, too familiar path in painting, or why he believes he can say more important things with greater effect by the abstract method. The book fails to touch on the particular problems, limitations and advantages that arise in abstract painting, and it also fails to show the two obvious directions of surrealism today: the use of a nineteenth-century technique by one group of surrealist artists and the use of more original and more purely plastic techniques by another group.

Probably the only major contention of the book is that understanding modern art depends mainly on what the book calls, but never defines, "science," which is expressed by its terrible first sentence, "Science is the open sesame of twentieth-century art, and artists have entered where angels fear to tread." Most of the data in the text are labeled in one way or another "scientific" ("Surrealism is a scientific mirror held up to nature . . . ," "The whole purpose of painting has been reëxamined with scientific precision . . . ," "The background of modern life [is] scientific"). The author doesn't make the slightest effort to say what he means by science, so I won't be able to. But what usually takes place is that some theoretical perception once made by an artist is lifted out of its relation to his painting and said to be scientific, the key to what that artist's painting is about and to its place in twentieth-century art. The artist's perception is made in this way to lose all of its painting tone and is expanded until it loses all relation to the artist's work; when one artist's statement is followed by another's, similarly isolated and expanded, and then by many more, the result gives a picture of artists with yardsticks and microscopes, a picture grossly distorted from the real occupation of painters. A typical passage is:

> Just what is twentieth-century art? Let us see. Our starting impulse came from . . . impressionism with the breaking up of light, and from Cézanne with the geometric postulate of the cube, the cone and the cylinder. Cubism discloses its joint heritage with the breaking up of the object; and in the geometric physiognomy of its pictures.

Mr. Janis then explains that it is not exactly all mathematics but "the result of ideas which were transmuted through the creative processes."

It is one of the hardest books to read that I have ever come up against. Part of the trouble isn't Mr. Janis' but the publisher's, who printed the text in loggy black type on a shiny paper that reflects as much light as print. The writing is too often more that of a promoter than a critic, and is generally as questionably hearty as in this estimation of the American art public, whose change of attitude during the last twenty years "has been both cumulative and compelling, an indication of its vitality, its immediacy and its ability to furnish these esthetic gratifications which are so necessary for spiritual survival." A maximum number of clichés appear, and the author jumps from one muscular, undefined and arguable thought to another:

> In an epoch throbbing with vitality and rhythms of a new spirit, a time of courageous exploration and rewarding discovery, perceptive faculties could hardly do otherwise, perhaps, than make a proper and consistent response to the force of the age. However that may be, the fact remains that with the opening up of vast new fields in science, the imagination of the artist has responded deeply to the method and scope involved. That is why, to participate in today's culture, it is only necessary that a country be infused with modernization of its physical equipment.

Both the surrealist and abstract painters believe their particular modes of expression permit them to get at areas of reality that could be approached through naturalistic representation only by weakening their design with superfluous or veiling facts. The abstract artist (and, I suspect, many surrealists) believes that the essential expressive elements in painting are color, line, form and the other plastic means of design, and that painting should be made up of these essential elements as purely as possible. The medium itself is explored more thoroughly than ever before in Western art by the more advanced modern painters. Color, for instance, is considered for its other hues, intensities and tones besides its realistic ones; the painting surface is conceived of as flat and bounded rather than as the traditional mirror into limitless space; painting is created as something to be picked up and looked at as well as seen on an easel or wall. There is every chance for a new and great art.

One fact that will help lift the standard of painting here or anywhere else is that the critics assess the esthetic values in individual works of art as exactly and thoroughly as possible, and make clearly known their evaluations. Mr. Janis, however, doesn't make known his estimates of the paintings in his book; his selection seems to me as undiscriminating as possible except for the fact that he chooses works that are in some way—perhaps only the vaguest—surrealist or abstract. The result is that the reader will have a difficult time finding what is more or less abstract, surrealist or esthetically valuable in this book's illustrations, and will also get an ex-

[1] Abstract and Surrealist Art in America, by Sidney Janis. New York: Reynal and Hitchcock. 146 pages, with 100 pages of illustrations, 10 in full color. $6.50.

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aggeratedly depressing picture of the quality of work being done in the two modes today.

The most characteristic shortcoming of the paintings reproduced in this book is that most of them attempt to aim no higher than at a mildly dynamic arrangement of one or possibly two painting elements, which in turn are explored for only a fraction of their particular properties. Or else the attempt is for no more than an illustration of other subject matter besides nature's. Often the result in a painting is only a meaningless surprise or the emptiness of unbacked-up charm, rather than a full, plastic expression of something important to the artist. It seems to me that the most important American painting shown in this book was done by Jackson Pollock, Robert Motherwell (both of whom are represented by good examples of their work), William Baziotes (who isn't), Alexander Calder, Hans Hoffman and Joseph Cornell.

There is also, under most of the paintings reproduced in this "first survey of its kind," a statement by their creators. The best thing about most of the statements is their earnestness and plainness; the worst is that so many of them show the author's kind of "scientific" interest in painting. I have great respect for seven artists who said nothing, almost as much as I have for what C. S. Price said: "I have been trying to learn to paint for forty years, but still don't know what it is all about. Have drifted all over the western part of the U. S., riding and working in the cow country, but have managed to keep at painting most of the time."

I think another book should be written to fill in all the spaces Mr. Janis left empty or clouded. Though Mr. Janis is sometimes misleading, he indicates more knowledge of his subject than he demonstrates, which seems to come from his likable desire to promote modern art. MANNY FARBER

France: The Literary Situation[1]

SO MANY CHANGES here in Paris, but happily they are only superficial. (White wine at 20 francs a glass and the politeness of the police. But the wine will soon be cheaper, and the police ruder.) During the first two hours here the changes were striking and disquieting, but afterwards it is the tough continuity of Paris which seems most remarkable. Above all the *will to be happy*. Here, where the irritable restrictions are twenty times more severe than the suspect restrictions of London, the people are twenty times more alive. This is no reflection on poor, war-weary, unliberated London, but it is a tribute to the effervescence of Paris. For more than a century and a half this city has been a spasmodic volcano, and now it is in full eruption. Not that the barricades are any longer up; not that the occasional shots at night are more than a wistful craving for action—but that Paris can dance and dispute and sing again. It is an intoxication without alcohol, an ecstasy without opium, almost a madness without psychosis. The air still vibrates with a half-incredulous sense of liberation. Posters show Marianne with her hand over her eyes, dazzled by the metaphorical radiance of freedom (the lack of literal illumination is one of the most severe impositions; most cafés are obliged to close at eight o'clock for absence of it).

But in the domain of French literature, the sense of resurrection is far less remarkable than the sense of continuity. For an Englishman it is both humiliating and invigorating to discover that the creative energy of French writers has easily defied four years of clumsy Teutonic interdiction.

There have been four principal methods of expression, which I give in order of *literary* importance, neglecting for the moment any political or spiritual consideration. First, and supremely the most important, has been the open publication of books and plays by writers who have been either consciously *"résistant,"* or, in a few cases, strangely but magnificently aloof. Second, the fertile and by no means contemptible production of the collaborators, most notably of Montherlant, Drieu la Rochelle, Céline, Giono, Jouhandeau and Maurras. Third, the clandestine publications —Les Editions de Minuit, Lettres Françaises, Les Cahiers de la Libération and Les Étoiles. Although these publications have included works by Mauriac, Vercors, Aragon, Sartre, Duhamel, Guéhenno and other writers of distinction, I rate them low in literary importance because their spirit was primarily combatant. Finally, certain books and reviews have been published in Switzerland and effectively smuggled into France. Of these the most important were probably Malraux's new novel, "La Lutte avec l' Ange" (Malraux is now a colonel on the Alsace front, with André Chamson serving under him as a captain), and the reviews, Cahiers du Rhône and Domaine Française.

Open Publications by Politically Reputable Writers.— It is no reflection either on the heroism of the clandestine writers—nearly all of whom published openly at the same time—nor on the savage philistinism of the Germans, to say that the most remarkable literary phenomenon of the last four years has been the energy, fertility and originality exhibited in the "legal" publications. A distasteful comparison with England can hardly be avoided, for France has maintained at least twelve open literary reviews under the occupation. At Lyons and Marseilles have appeared the admirable Confluences and Cahiers du Sud respectively; at Grenoble, Les Algues; in Paris, Le Livre des Lettres, the relatively collaborationist Cahiers Français and, until 1943, the deformed Nouvelle Revue Française under Drieu la Rochelle. Also at Lyons, L'Arbalète and Poésie, 1941, 1942, 1943 and 1944; at Montpellier, L'Echo des Etudiants and Formes et Couleurs; at Toulouse, Pyrénées; and in Algiers, Fontaine. Not a little freedom of expression was possible and practised in these reviews, so long as nothing was said directly against Vichy or the Germans.

On the other hand, Paul Claudel's Catholic essays against anti-Semitism, published in Paris during the early days of the occupation, were immediately suppressed by the Germans. Similarly the famous "Poésie et Vérité," by Paul Eluard, was sold openly in Paris for one week of 1942, then read by the authorities and suppressed. Among the other non-collaborationist works that appeared in the bookshops, the following would seem to be the most notable essays and novels (poetry and drama will be discussed later):

Aragon's "Le Voyageur de l'Impériale." Aragon has now returned to Paris and is editing the Communist paper, Ce Soir. (Eluard and Picasso are now both Communists.)

[1] Reprinted with permission from a longer article in Horizon, the English literary monthly.

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Gide's "Interviews Imaginaires" and his "Conférence sur Henri Michaux." A few pages of Gide's Journal for 1940 and 1941 appeared in Le Figaro some days ago, a vivid picture of distress hardening into resolute opposition.[1]

St. Exupéry's "Pilote de Guerre" ("Flight to Arras"). St. Exupéry is missing and presumed to be dead after an air fight in Italy, but details are still not known.

Valéry's "Variété V," "Tel Quel," I and II, and "Mauvaises Pensées." Valéry has remained aloof from the maelstrom of occupation and resistance, except for his oration (in a private session of the French Academy) on Bergson. He has always detested Bergsonian philosophy and the gesture was gratuitously anti-German. The essays of "Variété V" are all written in the crystal isolation of his incomparable prose. Of the few books that I have been able to read here, this was in many ways the most moving as well as the most impressive. Valéry is now writing a third Faust, in realization of his (expressly anti-Flaubertian) dogma that everything can be done in an infinite number of different ways.

Thierry-Maulnier's "Lecture de Phèdre." Maulnier, conservative and traditionalist, has retained something of Valéry's aloofness. His article on French civilization, printed in Les Cahiers Français, may be taken, both in its courage and in its uniqueness, as the equivalent of Valéry's essay on Bergson.

Paulhan's "Les Fleurs de Tarbes," a highly praised book of literary criticism. Paulhan, editor of the Nouvelle Revue Française during its reputable prewar years, has been extremely active in the clandestine movement.

Queneau's novel "Pierrot Mon Ami." A former surrealist, Raymond Queneau is at present director of the Radio Littéraire.

Colette's "Le Képi." This collection of stories shows no trace of any decline in her talent.

Jean Prévost's "La Création chez Stendhal." Prévost was killed in the Maquis in September. As well as being a leader of active resistance, he has published a great many articles in the open press since 1940. The loss of this enthusiastic and intelligent writer has been severely felt in France.

Elsa Triolet's "Le Cheval Blanc" and "Mille Regrets." Aragon's wife, she has been as active as her husband in the clandestine movement.

Schlumberger's "Jalons" and "Nouveaux Jalons."

Lanzo del Vasto's "Le Pélérinage aux Sources," a philosophical rejection of the West in favor of Indian mysticism.

Finally, the four-hundred-page volume, "Problems of the Novel," produced by Jean Prévost under the auspices of Confluences, gives an astonishing picture of critical activity. Contributors include Valéry and Cocteau (frivolous), Jaloux, Camus, Louis-Martin Chauffier (said to have been shot by the Germans a short time ago), Prévost, Simenon, Tavernier, Gertrude Stein and Elsa Triolet. Those articles which I have read are fully as fascinating as their titles—"Proust or the Double 'I' of Four Characters," "André Gide or the Drama of the Pure Novel," "The Mythology of Adolescence in the Contemporary Novel," "Montherlant or the Perpetual Novel." . . .

Translation of all English or American books published since 1850 was effectively forbidden. This permitted, however, a magnificent translation of "Moby Dick" by Pierre Leyris (the Provençal collaborator, Jean Giono, accompanied it with a tribute); De Quincey's "Essays," one of Hawthorne's early novels and, among foreign books, Kafka's "Great Wall of China."

Open Publications by Collaborationist Writers. – In this political camp (it has shown no particular sign of developing into a literary camp) there has been vigorous activity with a few striking results:

Montherlant's two plays, "La Reine Morte" and "Fils de Personne." These are probably the most notable achievements of the collaborationists (see Theatre below). Montherlant's novel, "Solstice de Juin," has been the most expressly pro-Nazi of all the literary works which have appeared under the occupation.

Céline's novel, "Guignol's Band," dealing with the *bas-fond* of prewar London. This is said to be typical of its author, unreadable to most readers, greatly admired by a few. Céline has also written a volume of essays, "Les Beaux Draps."

Marcel Jouhandeau's "Nouvelles Chroniques Maritales." Jouhandeau is a literary perfectionist, writing his intimate memories in a style of great purity.

Drieu la Rochelle's novel "L'Homme à Cheval": echoes of Lawrence's Mexico. He has also published "Chronique Politique," an attempt to justify his political past. It is believed that Drieu attempted suicide a few days before the liberation.

Maurras has collected his literary essays of the last twenty years. Giono produced a play, "Le Bout de la Route," and Paul Morand a life of Maupassant.

The National Committee of Writers has published a list of ninety-five writers with whom they will refuse to collaborate in future. But, with the exceptions noted above and three or four others, the list is composed entirely of journalists.

In addition there have been many translations of mediocre Nazi novels, notably the works of Jünger and Carossa, and a scandalous anthology of German poetry from which Heine is excluded. The shelves of German translations are the only obvious incongruity in the Paris bookshops.

The Clandestine Press. – I doubt whether anyone here would claim that many works of literary importance were produced clandestinely under the occupation. Nor was this the intention of those who organized and wrote for the various secret publications. The intention was to prove that the great majority of French writers detested the occupation and were prepared to risk their lives for the liberation of France. No one who has studied Les Editions de Minuit or the clandestine numbers of Lettres Françaises could doubt that the proof was triumphantly made. But, with Les Étoiles and Les Cahiers de la Libération of the Zone Sud, these heroic enterprises were primarily a militant weapon battling against the militant weapons of the collaborationists.

The first four open numbers of Lettres Françaises that appeared after the liberation of Paris were principally devoted to recounting the moving and often almost incredible story of the clandestine Press, to denouncing past collaborators and to mourning the dead. It is impossible to recapitulate here the histories of the different secret publications. Around Lettres Françaises the following were grouped: Jacques Decour (virtually originator of the enterprise, a Communist schoolmaster of outstanding courage even in this circle of brave men; he was discovered by the Germans and shot in 1942); Claude Morgan and Debru-

[1] "Imaginary Interviews" recently appeared here in translation (Knopf). His "Pages de Journal: 1939-1942" has been published here in French by Jacques Schiffrin and Company. Aragon's novel, "Le Voyageur de l'Impériale," had a curious history. Finished just before the war, it appeared here in translation ("The Century Was Young," Duell, Sloan and Pearce) before being published in France. The French edition, sold openly for a week or two, was then suppressed like the books by Claudel and Eluard. All of them appeared, incidentally, on the black market. – THE EDITORS

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Bridel (journalists), Jean Paulhan, Jean Prévost, Eluard, Aragon, Jean Blanzat, Michel Leiris, Edith Thomas, Sartre, Queneau, Camus, Guéhenno, Duhamel and, in a greater or lesser degree, at least a dozen more. That the clandestine printing press in Paris was three times discovered and destroyed by the Germans may give some small impression of the difficulties which these indefatigable men experienced.

Midnight Editions—Les Editions de Minuit—was the title under which a series of booklets was illegally published. There were, in all, nineteen of these booklets, including works by many of the writers grouped around Lettres Françaises, besides other works by Vercors, Maritain, Benda, Mauriac, Elsa Triolet (Mme. Aragon) and Jean Cassou (who wrote his "Thirty-three Sonnets" in prison) and a translation of Steinbeck's "The Moon Is Down." Among the most impressive contributions were the two by Vercors, "Le Silence de la Mer" and "La Marche à l'Étoile." Only three or four of his colleagues were trusted with the secret of his identity. He was known to the other clandestine writers as M. Desvignes, "a modest, scrupulous, sensitive man, completely unselfish," but M. Desvignes was not known as the author of "The Silence of the Sea." Even now Lettres Françaises has not seen fit to publish Desvignes' real name (Jean Bruller). All that can be said is that "The Silence of the Sea" was the first work of this new and talented writer.

Poetry.—With the exception of the verse that appeared in the Editions de Minuit and some of the underground newspapers, all the French poetry of the last four years has been published openly. It is a wide and uncharted sea, and any judgments or comments that I make must necessarily be even more hazardous than elsewhere. I write, however, largely on reliable instruction.

As in England there has been a profuse and varied production of poetry since 1940, and as in England few critics have yet dared to distinguish the sheep from the goats. An attempt has been made—as dubious, I suspect, as all such attempts at classification must be—to divide some of the younger poets into two schools: into the neo-romantic under the leadership of Aragon, and the neo-classicist under Eluard. In the first school have been grouped Loys Masson, Robert Morel, Luc Estang and (though older) Pierre Emmanuel. As for Paul Eluard, who is held in even greater respect than Aragon, he has been marvelously productive since 1940. Like Aragon, he has abandoned previous obscurities for an extreme and crystal clarity. I am uncertain about the school of Eluard, though a few names were quoted to me which I had never heard before—no token, alas, that they were not well known French poets.

Claudel, Valéry, Jouve and Supervielle are still the respected (though, as poets, relatively unproductive) masters of French poetry. The veteran symbolist, Saint-Pol Roux, was killed by the Germans in June, 1940. Max Jacob died in a concentration camp, and the poet Politzer was shot some months ago.

A puzzling and important figure is Henri Michaux. Little known in 1940, although he had already published a number of books, he was introduced by Gide in that year and has since been claimed as the greatest living French poet after Valéry. His name is mentioned with something

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of the awe which aureoles the name of Rimbaud, and in something of the same terms as those in which the worshipers of Henry Miller praise their master. Michaux's admirers claim that he is the most original poet of the century, the most accurate, the most perceptive and the least stylized. I can do no more than quote (on instruction) the following poem:

CLOWN[1]

One day
One day soon, perhaps,
One day I shall tear loose the anchor that holds my ship far from the sea.
With the sort of courage it takes to be nothing and nothing but nothing,
I shall let go of whatever seems to me indissolubly close.
I shall hack it off, overturn and smash it, send it tumbling down.
At one stroke emptying myself of my miserable shame, my miserable schemes, my slow logical progressions,
Having drained the abscess of being somebody, I shall again drink deeply of nourishing space.
By follies, by failures (what is failure?), by explosion, by emptiness, by a total dissipation, derision, purgation, I shall expel from my being the form that seemed so well attached, composed, coördinated, suited to my surroundings and to my worthy, so worthy fellows.
Humbled as if by catastrophe; leveled to the ground as after an intense quarrel;
Reduced beneath all measure to my real rank, to the insignificant place that I do not know what idea-ambition had led me to desert;
Destroyed in respect to arrogance and esteem;
Lost in a distant place (or even not lost), without name, without identity;
Clown, groveling in the absurd, in public mockery, in the feeling that against
All reason I had formed of my importance,
I shall plunge
Penniless into the infinite underlying mind open to all;
Myself open to a new and incredible dew,
By dint of being null
And flat
And laughable.

Theatre. – The Germans appear to have interfered very little with the freedom of the Paris stage, and there has been a varied and fertile dramatic activity. An important event was the production for the first time of Claudel's "Soulier de Satin." This famous, but previously unactable, play was cut and edited for the stage by Jean-Louis Barrault; its success at the Comédie Française was enormous, and it appears to have attained an almost symbolic stature as a monument to the traditional spiritual identity of the French theatre.

At about the same time, a magnificent production of Giraudoux's new play "Sodome et Gommorrhe" was given in Paris (settings by Bérard). Giraudoux also produced two films under the occupation. His death earlier this year (there is a suspicion that he was poisoned by the Germans) has been bitterly felt. He had been watched so closely that his participation in the clandestine movement was impossible, but he was universally respected.

Cocteau has produced three new plays since 1940: they are described to me as follows: "La Machine à Ecrire"—"a sort of parody of all the conventions of the Boulevard theatres between two wars"; "Renaud et Armide"—"the finest play presented at the Comédie Française during the occupation. An attempt to modernize the classical tragedy of the seventeenth century"; "Antigone"—"a fine classical drama; music by Honegger." Thus Cocteau would seem to have covered his whole known territory, from extreme frivolity to severe classicism. Like Giraudoux, he has also directed two "poetic films": "The Phantom Baron" and "The Eternal Return."

In the classical school of Cocteau and Giraudoux, a new dramatist has appeared since 1940, Jean Anouilh. His "Euridice" and "Antigone" are described to me as "two attempts to carry over ancient myths into the modern era."

Montherlant's two plays, "La Reine Morte" and "Fils de Personne" have both appeared in Paris during the last eighteen months. The first was a luxuriant and skillful eulogy of absolute power. "Fils de Personne" deserves, perhaps, a brief recapitulation. The hero, a liberated prisoner of war, returns to his "family" in the unoccupied zone at the end of 1940. He finds a mistress, to whom he is indifferent, and his unknown son. The play revolves round the efforts, and final failure, of Georges to discover in his son some flame of greatness or of creative vitality. Failing, he dispatches wife and son to a northern city which is suffering from heavy aerial bombardment. Even the most fanatical of the purgers have granted Montherlant's great talent as a playwright, and the theme of "Fils de Personne" would seem to have suited it. From the reviews of these plays it doesn't seem that they could be described as more than crypto-fascist—"in the 1936 fashion." He was always that. (His "June Solstice" was a different and far more disreputable matter.)

Probably the most sensational dramatic event of the period has been the development of Jean-Paul Sartre into a major playwright. His first play, "Les Mouches," was produced about a year ago. Based on the theme of Orestes, it dealt with a moral problem which was both topical and profound: the right to kill. Has one the right to kill another man when the death of ten innocents will be the inevitable result? (Assassination by the Maquis—reprisals on hostages by the Germans.) Sartre's answer was an unequivocal but considered Yes.

His second play, "Huis Clos"—"Behind Closed Doors"—is now being shown at the Vieux Colombier, where I saw it a week ago. I am tempted to describe it in detail, for it was a nearly perfect production, beautifully acted (by young and unknown actors) and austerely produced. The scene is laid in Hell, a grim and windowless Empire room, furnished only with three chairs and an immense bronze. The hero, who is the first to enter, has tortured his wife for five years, deserted from the front and been shot for cowardice. He is quickly followed (he has hardly had time to bless, at least, his solitude) by a vampire-like Lesbian and a beautiful woman who has killed her child. This hell, cumulative in horror until the almost intolerable climax, is cruelly simple: "Hell is the others." Each of the three needs another in order to be assured of his own existence (there is no looking-glass in the room and hand mirrors have been removed from the ladies' bags). Each pair, in terrible rotation, must combine against the third in order to feel the

[1] Translation by Malcolm Cowley. – THE EDITORS

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solidarity of superior strength. The three have been carefully chosen for an eternity of mutual punishment. Hatred is insatiable—but silence is impossible.

Tendencies. – The rise of Sartre to his present position (among the five or six most discussed and most admired writers in France) is clearly of great, though in some ways obscure, importance. When he disappeared from our view in 1940, it was something of a distinction in England even to have heard of "La Nausée." His stature is now great enough to maintain two accredited and respected disciples in the persons of Michel Leiris and Albert Camus. That this school derives in some sense from Kafka, that they purvey "the philosophy of the absurd" and that they have been somewhat portentously christened "the Existentialists" is as much as I can safely write. Kafka is as much discussed in Paris today as he was in London ten years ago. The discovery appears to have come later, and with accumulated effect.

There would also appear (and it is only of appearances that I can possibly write in this section) to have been a certain "return to Péguy." This was partially encouraged by the Vichy people, known as the *gens du Trafapa* (a word formed by combining the first syllables of their catchwords, *Travail, Famille, Patrie*), but was also a very natural search for consolation in a great French writer and mystic. Mysticism, both Catholic (La Tour du Pin) and Indian (del Vasto) has captivated several young poets.

Proust, though republished under the occupation and admirably defended by Louis-Martin Chauffier, has suffered the inevitable reaction from yesterday's enthusiasm. I am told that he is often (and how curiously!) dismissed by young writers as a more vulgar Henry James. Henry James is greatly admired by these young writers, but hardly more than Pater! Hawthorne and Emerson have been resurrected in the wake of Melville, and I detect an exaggerated respect for Faulkner, Dos Passos and Caldwell. Grossly too little is known of the English writers of the inter-war period.

There is no school of Montherlant in the sense of literary imitation, but he has many disciples. One of them has written a book, with the provocative title, "Montherlant—Free Man." This statement, incidentally, is literally and rather surprisingly true. Montherlant is still at large in Paris, and it seems improbable that any punitive measures will be taken against him or against any of the other collaborationist writers.[1] Although no member of the Comité National des Ecrivains will write for any paper which publishes their works, there is nothing to prevent Céline, Montherlant and Giono from starting a separate review for ex-collaborationists.

Among those easily affected by the variations of literary fashion it would certainly seem that Flaubert's reputation has never been lower. There is a horror of documentation, accompanied by a rather naïve suspicion of "fervor." (Astonishing to find that one of the principal literary conflicts is still between Catholics and free-thinkers, between les Claudéliens and les Valériens.) In Flaubert's "Salammbo" and his "Temptation of St. Anthony," the more

[1] Since this article was written, Robert Brassilach, journalist, novelist, historian and editor of the collaborationist paper, Je Sais Tout, has been sentenced to death. – THE EDITORS

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vigorous of the Valériens have discovered an offensive fervor. But, as if by some comical and illogical adjustment of the scales, Stendhal is now acclaimed as the greatest of all the great French novelists. Jean Prévost, who lost his life fighting for the Maquis, was the distinguished herald and leader of this enthusiasm. A common sentiment is "Stendhal is hard; Flaubert is not."

So far as public taste is concerned, "Gone with the Wind" is as popular here as anywhere else, and there is a passion for all the works of Charles Morgan.

I know that praise of France at the expense of England is a greatly hated activity. But after sixteen days in this astonishing Paris of September, 1944, it is an activity which cannot honestly be avoided. In the literature of these four years France has been incomparably and undeniably superior, and it is only of literature that I am writing. I have tried to give a picture (and its inadequacy must be obvious) of a prodigiously varied, fertile and exploratory literature, defying a period of privations, obstacles and tragedies. It is almost agonizing to contemplate a French investigator's similar research in London.

At least there is one certain and happy event in the immediate future, the breaking of the cruel barriers which have divided the world's two greatest literatures for so long. The joys and benefits of this mutual rediscovery are incalculable, and it may even be that these four years of isolation will lead to a more productive interchange of vision and imagination than ever before. As political world powers France and England have surely begun their period of decline. But, politically impotent and accepting their impotence almost as a blessing, why should they not present to a barren world the glories of a new artistic communion?

PHILIP TOYNBEE

[In next week's New Republic Malcolm Cowley will resume his discussion of "The Return of Henry James" with a review of F. O. Matthiessen's "Henry James: The Major Phase."—THE EDITORS]

Crime and Punishment

NET OF COBWEBS, by Elizabeth Sanxay Holding (Simon and Schuster, $2). Malcolm Drake, going through a pretty bad nervous breakdown after the Nazis sunk his ship, didn't pick the ideal spot for a rest-cure. For his brother's home is dominated by Aunt Evie, the leader of a Strength-through-Joy movement, American style, who would undoubtedly have driven him crazy if someone hadn't poisoned her. How Malcolm fights his way back to sanity makes a good story, especially in the early stages. But, Mrs. Holding, with Scotch above rubies in accessibility, how *could* you serve it with ginger ale?

PATTERN FOR MURDER, by Ione Sandberg Shriber (Farrar and Rinehart, $2). When Katie Sturtevant arrives in Cleveland to be maid of honor at Shannon Meade's wedding, she is knocked for a loop to discover that the groom is not to be Mark Frost, but Dr. David Hunt, Shannon's middle-aged guardian. What is even more confusing is that Mark is married to Dr. Hunt's daughter, though Shannon is still obviously in love with him. The unmistakable tension culminates in Hunt's murder on the eve of the wedding. Though needlessly complicated and overwritten, the story is made readable by some interesting characters. E. H.

Contributors

HENRY A. WALLACE, as all the world knows, ended his term as Vice President of the United States on January 20. He has been offered the post of Secretary of Commerce, replacing Mr. Jesse Jones, subject to congressional confirmation. His article in this issue is based upon a recent address before the American Statistical Association.

VERA MICHELES DEAN is the research director of the Foreign Policy Association and editor of its publications.

ANEURIN BEVAN, the fiery Welsh ex-miner and Member of Parliament, was recently elected to the executive committee of the British Labor Party. He is an editor of Tribune, the English socialist weekly, in which this article originally appeared.

W. S. WOYTINSKY is an economist working for the government in Washington. He is the author, among other books, of "Seasonal Variations in Employment in the United States," published by the Social Science Research Council in New York.

PHILIP TOYNBEE, critic and novelist, is the son of Arnold Toynbee, the British historian, and the author of "The Barricades," published last fall by Doubleday, Doran and Company. His reviews appear regularly in The New Statesman and Nation.

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